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Introduction
Helping the unemployed to become competitive in the labour market is preferable
to providing them with income support only: instead of just giving cash beneﬁts,
it is more desirable to help individuals to go back to work by improving their
skills and competencies. This general and widely accepted principle is the basic
rationale for Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs), contrary to passive labour
market policies which try to alleviate unemployment problems by guaranteed cash
beneﬁts. If carefully designed and tightly managed, these policies have been shown
to help the unemployed overcome diﬃculties in ﬁnding a job, and to improve the
functioning of the labour market more generally. Yet in the great majority of
OECD countries much more is spent on passive income support than on ALMPs,
and many governments have found it diﬃcult in recent years to accommodate
a faster rise in spending on ALMPs or a switch of funds from passive to active
measures1.
Action to combat unemployment is a central element of the Danish labour
market policy. Indeed, since the birth of ALMPs in 1978 Denmark is one of
the countries that applies it the most. From that time on, ALMPs in Denmark
have changed a lot, concerning the instruments adopted and the eﬃciency of its
programmes. There are, in particular, two features which characterize the present
programmes (or measures or policies) and distinguish them from the programmes
1Source: OECD website.8 Introduction
used in the 1970s and the 1980s:
² the principle that rights must be accompanied by duties (right and duty
principle);
² decentralization: much more than before, it is now up to responsibility of
regional and local authorities to decide which measures should be taken at
regional and local level.
The results of these reforms in the implementation of ALMPs are undoubtedly
encouraging, if broadly (and roughly) judged from the dynamics of unemployment:
from 1993 to 1999, unemployment has fallen by approximately 60%, i.e. by 200,000
people, and long-term unemployment has fallen from about 145,000 people to
approximately 40;000 2. In the light of this positive development, a number of
adjustments to the measures combatting unemployment have been introduced,
with a view to making them better targeted on getting the unemployed - including
the long-term unemployed - back into ordinary employment.
In Denmark, an unemployed person will in a fairly short time end up in an
ALMP. Actually this happens , e.g. for young people in less than one year. Thus,
it is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to ﬁnd unemployed people who have never partici-
pated in a programme. This lack of a standard control group in some ways puts a
shadow on the real aim of an evaluation, given that our interest is on the impact
of a programme (the diﬀerence between a treated group and a non-treated group,
entirely similar to the treated one except for not having been treated). As a con-
sequence, I will focus on the relative eﬃciency of diﬀerent programmes. Such an
evaluation exercise, however, is by no means useless: comparing the impacts of two
programmes can help the policy maker in allocating resources eﬃciently. Given the
fact that the unemployed have to partecipate in a programme, it is useful to know
which programme reaches its goal in the best way. Besides, this approach also has
an advantage: we only have to include participants in the empirical analysis.
Among all the ALMPs, private sector programmes (PRPs) have always been
pointed to as the most successful programmes to help the unemployed to go back
2The Danish Ministry of Employment.9
to work. But they have never been compared to only public sector programmes
(PRPs). Graversen and Jensen (2004) compare PRPs to all the other ALMPs,
but not private- to public sector programmes. Questions like “Are private sector
programmes really better than the public sector programmes?” and, if so, “Why
are PRPs better?” have never been answered. Just looking at the raw data3 may
be misleading since there might be some deeper reasons why PRPs are so success-
ful: is it because of the type programme or have PRP participants got diﬀerent
characteristics which make them more likely to get a job after completion of the
programme? To answer all these questions, I use an empirical model originally
formulated by Aakvik et al. (2000): the model consists of a ﬁrst equation select-
ing individuals into private- or public sector programmes and two other equations
to model the probability of being employed after the end of the two programmes,
respectively.
In Denmark, there are two diﬀerent administrative systems referring to two
diﬀerent groups of unemployed people:
² the ﬁrst group comprises unemployed people who are insured against unem-
ployment and who qualify for unemployment beneﬁts4. Measures in relation
to this group are regulated by the Act on an active labour market policy,
which falls under the competence of the Ministry of Labour;
² the second group comprises unemployed people who either are not insured
against unemployment or do not meet the conditions for qualifying for unem-
ployment beneﬁts, but are entitled to social assistance. The rules concerning
this group are laid down in the Act on an active social policy, which falls
under the competence of the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs.
I will concentrate my attention on welfare beneﬁt claimants (non-insured work-
ers), since evaluations for unemployment beneﬁts claimants have been numerous
3The dataset used is a register-based dataset constructed by The Danish National Institute
of Social Research in collaboration with Statistics Denmark. See Chapter 5 for details.
4In Denmark, it’s not compulsory to be insured against unemployment and only those who
are insured can receive unemployment insurance beneﬁts (UI beneﬁts) provided that they meet
the necessary requirements.10 Introduction
and detailed, while there has been much less interest in the unemployed on social
assistance (this is the case in Denmark and in other countries too5).
For both groups, the decision to assign unemployed workers to any speciﬁc
available active labour market policy is done by caseworkers, at local level. The
most common method is to have the unemployed person meet a caseworker, to
discuss the diﬀerent possibilities and to agree on the most suitable programme
together with the caseworker’s evaluation of individual skills and the availability
of local programmes. This is done because in the policy maker’s opinion the “opti-
mal” assignment requires knowledge of the individual - observable - characteristics
of the unemployed person and the local labour market, combined with the pre-
sumed professional experience of the caseworker6. However, in some cases selection
might be based on unobservable characteristics as well: caseworkers may not gain
all the necessary information from the interview so that some relevant characteris-
tics could remain hidden. Obviously, these hidden characteristics (individual, but
also regional), if not accounted for, may lead to possible bias in the results. To
avoid this, in the empirical model I will take both observable and unobservable
characteristics into consideration.
A third special trait of the model used here is the possibility to control for
possible heterogeneity in the way participants respond to programmes. Usually,
researchers implicitly think that diﬀerent individuals all react in the same manner
to a programme. Because of “the fundamental problem of policy evaluation”
(Holland, 1986), i.e. the impossibility of an observable outcome for both the
treated and non-treated state for every individual (if a participant is treated (s)he
can not be non-treated as well), to calculate the impact of a speciﬁc programme one
usually refers to an average impact, which is assessed using population averages.
However, in some cases (depending on the model speciﬁcation) it is possible to
calculate other parameters of interest. The model used in this dissertation allows
the treatment eﬀect to vary among observationally identical individuals so that it
5Graversen and Jensen (2004).
6Anyway, Lechner and Smith (2003) show that most of the times caseworkers do about as well
as a random assignment of the unemployed person to programmes. In some way, they neither
add nor subtract value to the assignment.11
is possible to calculate the distribution of the treatment eﬀect.
Hence, the model I use to investigate whether PRPs are really better than
PUPs, or whether indeed PRP participants are diﬀerent to PUP participants, is
as follows:
² a latent variable structure, made by three discrete outcome equations: the
ﬁrst for selection of individuals into the two programmes and the latter two
for employment outcomes;
² selection on observable characteristics and on unobservables as well (using a
one normal factor structure on the three equations errors);
² the possibility of the treatment eﬀect to vary among individuals.
This structure is convenient since it will be possible to see if results are sensitive to
the selection of the unobservables and to estimate mean as well as distributional
parameters.
I will only look at the employment eﬀect of the programmes, since it is the
main purpose of ALMPs. There might be other eﬀects, e.g. occupational choice
and subsequent earnings, but these are beyond the aim of this study. I will also
consider three diﬀerent time horizons for the employment outcome, namely 6, 12
and 24 months, to check whether there is a trend over time on the employment
eﬀect of the programmes.
Results are really surprising: the diﬀerence between PRPs and PUPs is mainly
due to the selection process, since individuals selected in private sector programmes
have pretty diﬀerent characteristics from public sector participants. Besides, con-
trolling for unobservable characteristics is necessary since in this case results are
much diﬀerent from the ones obtained only by selecting individuals on the ob-
servables. The relative impact on a randomly selected individual is positive but
small, while, on the contrary, an actual participant in a PRP does not gain from
participation (on average). With time, these results are likely to get better, as
if participants in PRPs could improve their employability skills as time passes.
Estimates show a great amount of heterogeneity among individuals and a perverse
selection process where participants least likely to take a PRP are those most likely12 Introduction
to beneﬁt from it. For the majority of individuals there is nothing to be gained by
participating in a PRP rather than a PUP7.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 I
introduce the Danish Welfare System and its functioning, some basic features of
the Danish labour market, the birth and the subsequent development of ALMPs,
the diﬀerent systems for insured and non-insured unemployed. Chapter 3 brieﬂy
outlines the evaluation problem and accounts for previous studies in this ﬁeld.
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are the model and the data chapters, respectively. In
Chapter 6 I then report and discuss results from the empirical analysis (all the
tables are attached in Appendix D), while the last chapter concludes.
7These results are basically the same as in Graversen and Jensen (2004).Chapter 2
Institutional settings
The principle behind the Danish welfare model (but one can refer to a more general
Scandinavian welfare model, since among the Scandinavian countries there are
little structural diﬀerences) is that beneﬁts should be given to all citizens who
fulﬁl the conditions, without regard to employment or family situation. The system
covers everyone; it is universal. And the beneﬁts are given to the individual, so
that e.g. married women have rights independently of their husbands.
In the ﬁeld of unemployment the right to beneﬁts is, however, always depen-
dent on former employment and at times on the payment of contributions, and,
possibly, also on being a member of a trade union (new graduates and newly ed-
ucated people obtain entitlement to beneﬁts one month after completion of the
education/training). However, the largest share of the ﬁnancial burden is still
carried by the State and ﬁnanced from general taxation, not in the main from
earmarked contributions.
In Denmark the State is involved in ﬁnancing and organizing the welfare ben-
eﬁts available to the citizens to a far greater extent than in other European coun-
tries. For that reason the welfare model is accompanied by a taxation system
which has both a broad basis of taxation and a high taxation burden. The pattern
of organization is also far simpler and immediately comprehensible than is the case
of other European countries.
In Denmark most of the social welfare tasks are undertaken by the State or
local authorities, and only to a limited extent by individuals, families, churches or14 Institutional settings
non-governmental welfare organizations.
A further characteristic is the fact that, in addition to cash beneﬁts, citizens
are entitled to a wide range of service beneﬁts: these are either free or subsidized.
In the social ﬁeld the organization and ﬁnancing of both transfer payments and
service beneﬁts take place within the same uniﬁed system.
After the Second World War an important part of the Danish welfare model
sought to ensure full employment to all citizens. However, this has not been
possible since the middle of the 1970s, when unemployment became an urgent
problem.
However, the welfare state has never been an unchallenged system, and in
recent years it has reached crisis point. The crisis consists of many elements and
is largely due to the fact that the present welfare arrangements originated and
developed in the 1960s and 1970s at a time of high economic growth and low
unemployment. At that time, it was not anticipated that so many people would
receive unemployment beneﬁts or cash beneﬁts or that they would receive them
for so long as has been the case in recent years1.
The ﬁnancing of the welfare state has thus become a problem, and as it has not
been politically possible to increase taxes, which are already very high, Denmark
(like the other Scandinavian countries) has accrued a very large national debt
which long term could represent a threat to the welfare system2. The question is
therefore whether the national compromise can be maintained in the future.
In all the Scandinavian countries a supplementary welfare system has devel-
oped in recent years, giving greater beneﬁts to those who are in the labour market.
This is a clear deviation from the equality principle which is at the heart of the
Scandinavian welfare model. The breach has occurred partly because better ar-
rangements have been reached (through collective agreements) between employers
and employees: these are beneﬁts paid out to the vast majority of employees, who
are included in such agreements, but not to all citizens.
1The Danish Ministry of Employment.
2Source: OECD website.2.1 Labour market and employment 15
2.1 Labour market and employment
Of the Danish population of 5.4 million (2003), the labour force, i.e. those in
employment and the unemployed, consists of approximately 2.9 million. Of the
remaining 2.5 million Danes, almost half are children and students without work,
and over 40% are pensioners (including people on early retirement). The remaining
10% consists of husbands or wives at home and those receiving State support but
unconnected to the labour market.
Between 1940 and 2002, the population in Denmark rose by approximately
1.5 million, while the labour force rose by approximately 1 million during the
same period. The labour force proportion of the population thus increased during
this period from 51% to 54%. This is partly because a larger proportion of the
population is of working age (16-66), and partly because more people in this age
group are active in the labour market.
Of the working age population group, the labour force makes up 78%. This
participation rate is one of the highest in the world, which is largely due to the
very high proportion of economically active women in Denmark: 74% of women in
this age group are in the labour force (2002), a ﬁgure only exceeded by Sweden.
The growth of the labour force 1940-2002 is divided among 0.3 million men
and 0.7 million women. The male increase in the labour force was concentrated
in the period 1940-1960, resulting from the growth in population, whereas the
increase of women started around 1960 and derived especially from changes in the
participation pattern (and associated changes in living arrangements). Trends in
the 1990s suggest that the participation rate of women of all age groups will reach
only a couple of percentage points below that of men. A particular Danish (and in
part Scandinavian) characteristic is that women retain their links with the labour
market after having children.
A more recent trend consists of a decline in the participation rate of the younger
and older age groups, both men and women. In the youngest age groups the reason
is a longer period of education for a large proportion of the group. In the older
age groups the reason is earlier withdrawal from the labour market (pensions and
early retirement beneﬁts).16 Institutional settings
Although the work force has grown by almost 50% since 1940, the number of
hours worked has not increased correspondingly. Holiday entitlement has been
extended from three to ﬁve weeks a year, and the working week has dropped from
48 to 37 hours. Besides, many groups of employed in the private sector have
had their holiday entitlement extended to six weeks. Finally, the proportion of
part-time employees has grown, although the trend has been reversed in recent
years. Therefore, the overall number of hours worked in 2001 recorded a decline
of 10% as compared to 1940.
The level of education of the work force rose between 1940 and 2001, as is seen
partly in the fact that the proportion of salaried employees and skilled workers
has risen at the cost of self-employed people and unskilled workers. This in turn is
also connected with a shift in recent years in employment in diﬀerent industries.
Since the 1970s, the number of employed has grown by 7%, primarily on account
of increased employment in the public sector. On the other hand, employment
in agriculture and manufacturing has fallen. For the remaining industries taken
together, employment is unchanged.
Coming to unemployment, while in the 1960s and early 1970s it was under
3%, which in practice meant there was full employment, since 1973 it has risen
considerably; it peaked in 1993, at 11% for men and 14% for women. By 2001 it
had fallen to 5% for men, and 6% for women. Measured in terms of the average
unemployment rate on a monthly basis, this meant just under 150,000 unemployed.
At the same time it meant that just under 550,000 - or one out of ﬁve of the labour
force - was unemployed for a shorter or longer period within a year.
The growing rate of unemployment at the beginning of the 1970s was seen as
a passing phase that would have been solved by ensuring that the unemployed
did not suﬀer ﬁnancially until they could ﬁnd work again. At the same time the
economy was being stimulated through a ﬁnancial policy aimed at creating more
jobs.
At the end of the 1970s an attempt was made to reduce unemployment by
limiting the labour force by encouraging older members to leave the labour market
and take early retirement beneﬁts or pensions. At the same time emphasis was
placed on a more active labour market policy (training and job oﬀers), in which2.2 Birth and developments of ALMPs in Denmark 17
the qualiﬁcations of the unemployed were maintained or improved.
2.2 Birth and developments of ALMPs in Den-
mark
The birth of the active labour market policy dates back to 1978 (ﬁrst Job Oﬀer Act
(ATB), based on oﬀers for the long-term unemployed) and since then Denmark
has a tradition of active policies, i.e. policies aimed at bringing the unemployed
back to work and conditional on the unemployed not being passive. The objective
of this tradition is to avoid marginalization and exclusion, and to preserve the
productive skills of the labour force. The Job Oﬀer Act contained Active Labour
Market Policies (as a part of Employability Enhancement Programmes, EEPs).
In 1985 the Job Oﬀer Act was reorganized and directed towards upgrading
qualiﬁcations so that, instead of the second job oﬀer, the unemployed were of-
fered up to eighteen months’ training with a training allowance or an enterprise
allowance.
Since 1988, focus has been directed more and more on targeted initiative to
raise personal skills and stricter availability requirements for unemployed people
receiving unemployment beneﬁts.
In 1994, the Labour Market Reform entered into force. It represented a marked
shift towards decentralization, individualization, and targeted programmes. Until
then, ALMPs were oﬀered at ﬁxed dates during a period of unemployment, and
participation in a programme provided a new period of unemployment beneﬁts.
Besides, these programmes were used to help young people without unemployment
insurance3. However, experience showed that this could lead to ineﬃcient solu-
tions, because standardized programmes did not take account of the qualiﬁcations
of the individual or the needs of the labour market. A good framework for solving
past problems was established, through a set of changes:
² decentralization;
3This is the reason why in the dataset used in this dissertation there is no information on
programme periods that ended before 1994, because the legislation was diﬀerent. See Chapter 4.18 Institutional settings
² improved possibilities basing programmes on the needs of both the individual
and the local labour market;
² withdrawal of the right to re-qualify for a period of daily cash beneﬁts during
an ALMP;
² duty for all the unemployed (young or not, insured or not) to partecipate in
such programmes if they want to retain eligibility in the future.
In order to further target the initiatives to upgrade the qualiﬁcations of the
unemployed, with the Finance Act of 1995 the right and duty principle to full-time
EEPs after four years’ unemployment was introduced. This principle states that
all unemployed workers (either insured or not) have the right to receive assistance
by the competent organization under the form of an ALMP-oﬀer; but at the same
time they have the duty to accept the oﬀer made, otherwise they loose eligibility
of beneﬁts in the future.
The 1996 Finance Act brought EEPs’ right and duty unemployment period
forward, introduced youth initiatives, and tightened employment availability re-
quirements for unemployment beneﬁts, as well as the requirements to re-qualify
for unemployment beneﬁts. The primary objective of the 1996 Finance Act was
to ensure the reduction in the number of long-term unemployed and make periods
of passive support from beneﬁts as short as possible. Furthermore, the Act was to
encourage training initiatives.
In the 1997 Finance Act, pilot projects with subsidies for the adult apprentice-
ship scheme were made permanent.
Availability rules were again adjusted in the 1998 Financial Act, in order to
support the increasing demand for labour and to secure a basis for continued
employment growth without shortages of labour which could lead to wage pressure.
Moreover, the rules for unemployed training leave were adjusted; training lasting
more than four weeks had to be approved by the Public Employment Service
(PES).
In 1999, the requirements of labour market policies were further tightened.
EEPs’ Right and duty was brought forward to apply after just one year. Youth2.3 The Act on an active labour market policy (insured... 19
initiatives were extended to include everyone under 25. From 2000 more ﬂexibility
was added to the initiatives and a new EEPs instrument was introduced: work
practice. Finally, there was a new oﬀer for long-term unemployed people over 48:
service jobs (i.e. jobs useful for the community, otherwise not performed).
To sum up, active labour market policy has developed considerably, in line
with the increasing unemployment which has occurred since the mid 1970s. Em-
ployability Enhancement Programmes have been developed and gradually brought
forward, while a number of new initiatives were introduced during this period. In
particular, the Labour Market Reform of 1994 provided a change from very regu-
lated initiatives, typically with oﬀers made at ﬁxed times, to a more ﬂexible system
which focuses on decentralization, individualization and targeting of initiatives on
the basis of the individual’s wishes and qualiﬁcations on the one hand, and the
needs of the labour market on the other.
2.3 The Act on an active labour market policy
(insured workers)
2.3.1 Several features
The aim of the Act on an active labour market policy is to contribute to en-
suring a well-functioning labour market through an active labour market policy
targeted on jobseekers and people (both unemployed and employed people) who
want to undergo education/training to ﬁnd a new job as well as private and public
employers.
In relation to employees and enterprises, the action taken is mainly in the form
of placement activities and information and guidance about labour market policy
oﬀers. In addition, guidance is oﬀered on support possibilities in relation to further
and continued training activities for the employees of the enterprises.
People under the age of 25 who qualify for unemployment beneﬁts have a right
and duty to an activation oﬀer if they have been unemployed for at least six months
out of a nine months period (the beneﬁt period for young people) within the frame-20 Institutional settings
work of ordinary youth education or training programmes or other publicly sup-
ported vocational guidance and job-oriented activities4 (for instance Production
Schools, which are self-governing institutions established by local or regional au-
thorities, or Day High Schools, which came into existence at the beginning of the
1980s and oﬀer teaching in general subjects for adults.). If a young person refuses
to accept a reasonable oﬀer, (s)he will forfeit the right to receive unemployment
beneﬁts.
The over 30s receiving unemployment beneﬁts have a right to a four-year sup-
port period, which is divided into a beneﬁt period of one year and an activation
period of three years. During the ﬁrst year - the beneﬁt period - the unemployed
person has a higher degree of responsibility for ﬁnding a job: the aim is to bring
the unemployed person back to work as quickly as possible. If the unemployed
person does not get a job during the beneﬁt period, (s)he goes into the activa-
tion period which has a duration of three years. Generally, the unemployed in
this group have greater diﬃculty in getting back into ordinary employment and
therefore they have a right and duty to oﬀers during the entire period5. If the
unemployed has not obtained a job after this total period of four years, it is the
task of the local authorities to make him enter the social assistance system.
At a central level, the active labour market is managed and administered by
the Ministry of Labour with the advisory assistance of the National Labour Market
Council (regional labour market councils have been set up at regional level).
2.3.2 Measures in relation to unemployed people qualify-
ing for unemployment beneﬁts
Measures in relation to unemployed people qualifying for unemployment beneﬁts
are a central element of the active labour market policy.
The following instruments can be used, either separately or in a combination:
4The allowance paid in connection with participation varies from one programme to another.
5In both periods, the unemployed have a number of duties. Besides, if the unemployed refuses
an oﬀer (s)he will be barred from payment of unemployment beneﬁts for a certain time or, in
special cases, (s)he will forfeit the entitlement to unemployment beneﬁts.2.3 The Act on an active labour market policy (insured... 21
² Placement activities in connection with ordinary work. The overall aim of
the measures is to bring the unemployed back to the ordinary labour market
in a non-subsidised job.
² Information and guidance. The unemployed are informed about their train-
ing and employment opportunities in the labour market.
² The drawing up of an individual action plan which forms the basis for mea-
sures in relation to the individual unemployed person.
² Job training both with public and private employers. Pay and other working
conditions are laid down by collective agreements or those normally applying
to the type of work concerned. However, a maximum hourly wage has been
ﬁxed for public job training. A wage subsidy is paid to employers who recruit
unemployed people in job training.
² Individual job training for people who have diﬃculties in ﬁnding a job or job
training on ordinary pay and working conditions. The wage may be lower
than in job training and is subject to agreement with the organizations,
which have the right to negotiate in the occupational ﬁeld concerned.
² Practical workplace training is an oﬀer of 2-4 weeks practical training in an
enterprise with a view to subsequent employment.
² Education/training, either in the ordinary educational/training system or as
an element of social tailor-made programmes (during participation in such
education the unemployed person may receive a training allowance).
² Job rotation is an important labour market instrument which can be used
to replace temporarily existing employees during sabbatical leave, parental
leave and training leave by unemployed people. Job rotation is seen as a
possible solution to three signiﬁcant challenges: help unemployed individuals,
increase employees’ motivation and ﬁll skill gaps.22 Institutional settings
2.4 The Act on an active social policy (non-insured
workers)
2.4.1 Several features
The aim of the Act on an active social policy - which should be seen in the context
of the Act on an active labour market policy - is to create oﬀers of employment,
education/training, and other activation measures for people receiving social as-
sistance. Therefore, the target group is people receiving social assistance, i.e.
unemployed individuals who are not insured against unemployment or who are
non eligible for unemployment insurance beneﬁts (when certain conditions related
to the overall income and wealth of the household are not met).
For people under the age of 30 whose major problem is unemployment, the oﬀer
- combined with any possible part-time work - must amount to at least 30 hours
per week. If the person has any problems in addition to unemployment, the local
authority lays down the weekly number of hours6. These people have to receive an
oﬀer not later than three months after the ﬁrst day on social assistance. If they do
not succeed to become self-supporting after the end of a programme, they have to
receive a new oﬀer three months after the end of the previous programme at the
latest7.
For people above the age of 30 years, the weekly number of hours and the
duration of the oﬀer may be laid down with due consideration to the person’s
needs and qualiﬁcation, regardless of the reason why this person is in on social
assistance. They should partecipate in a programme after twelve months at the
latest. They only have the right to receive one oﬀer during the social assistance
6This is mainly because, for people with other problems in addition to unemployment, partici-
pation in a programme should primarily improve everyday life. The hope is that the improvement
in everyday life will bring these people closer to the labour market and to a situation where they
can be self-supporting.
7Hence, people on social assistance under the age of 30 years are subject to a more or less
continuous treatment in programmes while on welfare.2.4 The Act on an active social policy (non-insured workers) 23
period8;9.
The administration of the social system is the responsibility of the Ministry
of Social Aﬀairs and it is decentralized and run by the municipalities (in contrast
with the labour market system, which is quite centralized). The costs of activation
of people on social assistance are paid by the local authorities. The State oﬀers
refunds/subsidies to the local authorities in connection with the costs of activation
of people on social assistance.
2.4.2 The instruments under the Act on an active social
policy
The instruments which local authorities may use under the Act on an active social
policy may comprise one or more of the following measures:
² guidance and introduction programme,
² job training,
² individual job training,
² participation in voluntary and unpaid activities,
² adult vocational training or continued training,
² job rotation,
² special tailor-made training activities,
² other special tailor-made activation activities.
8However, most municipalities choose to give a new oﬀer if the ﬁrst programme was not
successful in bringing the unemployed from social assistance to a self-supporting situation.
9Before mid-1998 the limit age dividing the two groups - under/over 30 - was 25. Besides,
another diﬀerence compared with the present rules is that the municipalities were not obliged
to give oﬀers to young people under 25 with problems in addition to unemployment. However,
a large part of the municipalities chose to oﬀer programmes to this group as well, even if they
were not required to do so.24 Institutional settings
In addition to these activation oﬀers, the local authority may also oﬀer other forms
of employment promoting measures, under other legislation.
Guidance and introduction programme The purpose of oﬀering short-term
guidance and introduction programmes is to identify the wishes and possibilities
of the person on social assistance in relation to further activation measures. The
programme must contain guidance on employment and educational possibilities
and provide the person with the possibility of testing diﬀerent types of jobs.
Job training People on social assistance may be given an oﬀer of employment
in private or public job training with a wage subsidy. Employment takes place on
contractual pay and working condition. However, the local authority lays down
the working hours in co-operation with the employer. Job training oﬀers must be
planned with due consideration to the nature of the workplace and the qualiﬁca-
tions of the individual person.
Individual job training Individual job training may be planned for unem-
ployed people on social assistance who have diﬃculties in ﬁnding a job on ordinary
pay and working conditions in the ordinary labour market. Individual job training
may be either private or public, including projects.
Voluntary and unpaid activities People on social assistance may - at their
own request - participate in voluntary and unpaid activities which are beneﬁcial
to society. The local authority decides which activities can be approved. The
activities must fall within the framework of a well-deﬁned project, an organization
or an association.
Adult vocational training or continued training People on social assistance
over the age of 25 may - at their own request - participate in adult vocational and
continued training courses listed on a special list on training leave. Participation
is conditional upon the person having received social assistance for 6 months and
the adult vocational or continued training course forms part of a written plan for2.4 The Act on an active social policy (non-insured workers) 25
the activation programme. Furthermore, it is a requirement that the person has
no prospects of obtaining a stable, non-subsidised job within the training period.
Job rotation As part of the activation measures the local authorities may use
schemes such as the job rotation scheme, where an unemployed person replaces an
employed one. In this way, a person on social assistance may be employed in job
training with a wage subsidy as a replacement for an employed person who is on
leave with an allowance under the Act on support for adult vocational training or
who is on leave under the Act on leave or the Act on conscription leave.
Special tailor-made training activities People on social assistance may be
given oﬀers of participation in special tailor-made training activities, e.g. education
in Day High Schools and Production Schools, primary school education at higher
grades, higher preparatory examination courses, etc.. The special tailor-made
training activities may for example, be combined with oﬀers of individual job
training.
Special tailor-made activation activities The special tailor-made activation
programmes are oﬀers that do not fall under other oﬀers, but which are combined
and composed to target on special groups. Such oﬀers aim at improving a person’s
quality of life, e.g. through supporting the handling of everyday activities and
the creation of a basic network. All people on social assistance have a duty to
accept activation oﬀers. The initiation and implementation of measures in relation
to people on social assistance fall under the competence of the individual local
authority.Chapter 3
The evaluation problem: a brief
outline
As explained in Chapter 1, my aim in this dissertation is to compare private sector
programme participants with public sector programme participants. This proce-
dure is not standard in social policies evaluations, since one is usually interested in
estimating the diﬀerence between participants and not participants in some kind
of programme. However, in Denmark every individual will eventually enter an
Employability Enhancement Programme, so that it is almost impossible to ﬁnd
individuals who have never participated in or have never been inﬂuenced by any
kind of programme; hence, it is almost impossible to construct a standard control
group. This does not mean there cannot be an evaluation of these programmes.
Instead of a comparison between treated and untreated, it is possible to compare
participants from two diﬀerent types of programmes, in a way that it should be
possible to evaluate which of the two policies is the most successful as far as some
dimension of interest (e.g. employment) is concerned. Hence, throughout the rest
of this dissertation when I use treatment eﬀect (or its distribution) I intend “dif-
ferential treatment eﬀect from participating in a PRP instead of a PUP” (I will
stress the diﬀerential nature of the treatment eﬀect only for the most important
cases). In some senses, given that one “has to” participate in some programme,
it is useful to know which is the most eﬃcient. The same approach was used, for
example, by Carling and Richardson (2001) where they estimate the relative eﬃ-28 The evaluation problem: a brief outline
ciency of eight Swedish labour market programmes in reducing the unemployment
duration for participants, and by Sianesi (2002) where she evaluates the diﬀeren-
tial performance of six main types of Swedish programmes that were available to
adult unemployed workers entitled to unemployment beneﬁts during the 1990s.
In this dissertation, I will evaluate the diﬀerential employment eﬀect of pri-
vate sector programmes relative to public sector programmes. There might be
other eﬀects due to participation in the programmes, but I will not look at them,
primarily because the main aim of ALMPs is to bring the unemployed back to
work1. Examples of previous papers evaluating employment eﬀects are Andr´ en
and Andr´ en (2002), who examine employment eﬀects of Swedish training pro-
grammes, and Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002), who evaluate the eﬀects of ALMPs on
individual employment probability in Switzerland.
The central problem in evaluating social programmes is to compare comparable
people. That is, one needs to be sure that possible diﬀerences between the eﬀect
of the two programme types are actually imputable to the programmes themselves
and not to individuals participating to programmes. I need to control for possible
heterogeneity in the two comparison groups, otherwise this could lead to biased
results. To do this, I use a three equations model with discrete outcomes: the
ﬁrst equation is used to account for the selection of individuals into PRP or PUP
of programme, the second and the third equation are the employment outcome
equations for PRPs and PUPs participants, respectively. In this way I will be
able to detect if private sector programmes are really more successful in bring-
ing the unemployed back to work than public sector programmes (as literature
often reports); besides, it will be possible to infer which characteristics aﬀect the
outcomes, and to what extent.
In addition to characteristics observable by the caseworker (who is in charge
1Possible additional diﬀerential eﬀects might be e.g. occupational choice and subsequent
earnings: it is by no means possible to exclude that a PRP participant will have a broader
choice opportunity in the job market or will experience a higher income after completion of the
programme compared to a PUP participant. This will simply not be taken into consideration by
the model used here.29
of allocating individuals in the most eﬃcient way2), the unemployed may diﬀer
in characteristics which are not observable by the caseworker, but which might
inﬂuence the treatment eﬀect as well3. To account for these unobserved character-
istics I added a one factor structure on the error terms from the three equations;
the factor is assumed to be normally distributed. This one factor structure has
been introduced by Heckman in 1981 and guarantees, together with the normality
assumption, ﬂexibility and simple calculations.
Most evaluations estimate mean eﬀects assuming implicitly that all the partici-
pants respond in the same way to programmes. But this of course may be not true.
With time, increasing emphasis has been put on models allowing for treatment ef-
fects to vary among observationally identical individuals4. The model developed
in this study has a latent variable structure (motivated by economics): one of its
advantages is that it can be used to generate mean treatment parameters and dis-
tributions of treatment parameters from a common set of structural parameters.
Thanks to this feature, it will be possible to answer questions like “What is the
overall eﬀect of PRPs relative to PUPs on employment probabilities?” or “Which
groups of individuals beneﬁt most from participation in PRPs instead of PUPs?”
and to gain a deeper understanding on the functioning of ALMPs. This model
was ﬁrst introduced by Aakvik et al. (2000) to analyze the impact of interventions
on discrete outcomes of Norwegian vocational rehabilitation programmes; it was
later used by Andr´ en and Andr´ en (2002) and Aakvik et al. (2003), among others.
I run the model for three diﬀerent time horizons, i.e. 6, 12 and 24 months
after the end of the programme. In this way, I try to construct a sort of “discrete
trend” of the probabilities of being employed after the end of the programme, in
order to follow the development with time of skills and opportunities given by the
programme. It will then be possible to assess not only if one programme is more
successful than another, but also if this advantage will change with time or not.
Finally, the results obtained may depend on some assumptions made in the
study. Hence, I perform further regressions to test whether the additional vari-
2A discussion on caseworkers’ added value can be found in Lechner and Smith (2003).
3Unobserved characteristics may be either individual and regional characteristics.
4See e.g. Heckman (2001).30 The evaluation problem: a brief outline
able in the selection equation is a valid instrument and if its use really improves
the empirical identiﬁcation of the model, and a robustness analysis for the factor
normality assumption following the procedure suggested by Heckman and Singer
(1984).Chapter 4
The econometric model
To estimate the employment eﬀect of private sector programmes relative to public
sector programmes I use the latent variable model of Aakvik et al. (2000). This
model uses simple latent variable structures to take into account the observed
characteristics aﬀecting the selection rule into PRP and the potential employment
equation for both PRP and PUP participants1, and a one-factor model for the
unobserved characteristics, under the assumption of correct speciﬁcation. With
this simple structure it is possible to eliminate the bias produced by not taking
into consideration the individuals unobserved characteristics and to estimate mean
treatment eﬀects as well as their distributions (since the model allows the treatment
eﬀect to vary among participants).
The fundamental issue of the evaluation problem is that it is not possible
to have people in two diﬀerent employment states2 (unemployed, employed). So
for each person i one assumes two potential outcomes (Y0i,Y1i) corresponding to
the potential employment outcomes if the person participated in a public sector
programme or in a private sector programme. Let Di be a dummy variable that
1Even though I use the same regressors (except for an additional instrumental variable in
the selection equation, not formally required, but left to improve the empirical identiﬁcation of
the model), I decided to use three separate equations instead of just one to see how variables
inﬂuence each outcome.
2For each person participating in a PRP there is a hypothetical state of how (s)he would have
done if participating in a public sector programme, and viceversa.32 The econometric model
equals 1 if the individual i participated in a private sector programme and 0 if
the individual participated in a public sector programme, respectively. Putting
together these few elements it is possible to write the observed employment state
as
Yi = DiY1i + (1 ¡ Di)Y0i : (4.1)
For the participation equation the model assumes a latent variable structure:
D
¤
i = Zi¯D ¡ UDi
Di = 1 if D
¤
i ¸ 0 (4.2)
Di = 0 if D
¤
i < 0;
where Zi is a vector of observed variables and UDi is an unobserved random vari-
able. In this framework, D¤
i can be thought of as the net utility to the caseworker
from choosing to assign the individual i to the private sector programme instead
of a public sector programme. So if the caseworker’s net utility is positive the
claimant is assigned to a private sector programme, to a public sector programme
otherwise.
The potential employment state has a latent index structure, with a linear
speciﬁcation in the parameters and additive separation between the observed and
unobserved components:





1i = Xi¯1 ¡ U1i
Y1i = 1 if Y ¤
1i ¸ 0
Y1i = 0 if Y ¤
1i < 0
(4.3)





0i = Xi¯0 ¡ U0i
Y0i = 1 if Y ¤
0i ¸ 0
Y0i = 0 if Y ¤
0i < 0 ;
(4.4)
where Xi is a vector of observed variables and (U1i;U0i) are unobserved random
variables. Y ¤
ji , j = 0;1, is a latent index capturing claimant’s ability and desire to
ﬁnd employment as well as job market conditions.
Henceforth, the following assumptions are taken throughout the rest of the
dissertation:33
1. (Y1i;Y0i) are deﬁned 8i;
2. there is no interaction among agents;
3. Z¯D is a nondegenerate random variable conditional on X = x;
4. (UD,U1) and (UD,U0) are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure on R2;
5. (UD,U1) and (UD,U0) are independent of (Z,X);
6. Y1 and Y0 have ﬁnite ﬁrst moments;
7. 0<Pr[D =1jX ]<1.
Assumption (3) implies the existence of an instrumental variable3 (a variable that
determines the participation decision but not directly the employment state: it is
basically an exclusion restriction on the two employment equations). Assumption
(7), instead, is a standard requirement: it says that it is needed to observe people
in both kind of programmes.
4.0.3 Individual treatment eﬀects
Before writing all the parameters of interest, I need to explain one of the main
features of this model, i.e. the possibility for the treatment eﬀect to vary among
individuals (that is, why I can estimate also distributional parameters).
First, let deﬁne the individual diﬀerential treatment eﬀect 4i in the following
way:
4i = Y1i ¡ Y0i = 1(Xi¯1 ¸ U1i) ¡ 1(Xi¯0 ¸ U0i);
so that 4i measures for all individuals the diﬀerence between the employment
state in case of participation in a PRP and the state in case of participation in a
PUP. It is straightforward to see that 4i can attain three values: -1, 0, 1. But if
the eﬀect of the unobserved variables U1i and U0i is the same in the two potential
3See e.g. Heckman (1990) for details.34 The econometric model
states (U1i = U0i) 4i can only attain two diﬀerent values for individuals with a
given value of X. That is, if we denote with Ui the common value of U1i and U0i:
if Xi¯1 > Xi¯0 :













) Xi¯1 < Ui




) Xi¯0 · Ui · Xi¯1
if Xi¯1 = Xi¯0 :
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Thus, it has been shown that diﬀerently from a model with continuous outcomes,
4i can vary even if the unobserved characteristics (the residuals of the two employ-
ment equations) are equal: this means that some people may have some “hidden”
characteristics that make her/him more or less likely to ﬁnd a job, no matter which
programme (s)he participated to.
Besides this source of heterogeneity given by the discrete outcome variables, I
add another heterogeneity component by letting U1i be diﬀerent from U0i: in this
framework, I allow individuals diﬀer from each other either on observed and/or
unobserved characteristics, so that all the three values of 4i may be experienced.
For ease of exposition and to simplify the notation, throughout the rest of the
paper I suppress the i subscript without lost of generality.
4.1 Treatment parameters
One of the advantages of the latent variable model developed above is that it can
be used to generate mean treatment parameters as well as distributional treatment
parameters from a common set of structural parameters.
4.1.1 Mean treatment parameters
Let 4 denote the treatment eﬀect for a given individual, where 4 = Y1 ¡ Y0.
This diﬀerence cannot be formed for anyone since Y1 or Y0 is missing (this is
“the fundamental problem of causal inference”, Holland (1986)). The statistical
approach to this problem is to replace the missing data on people using group
means (or other group statistics). Here I examine three diﬀerent mean parameters:36 The econometric model
² the average diﬀerential treatment eﬀect (ATE), which answers the question
of how much a randomly chosen individual would gain from participating in
a private sector programme instead of a public sector programme,
² the average diﬀerential treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT), which mea-
sures how much gained a person who participated in a PRP from participat-
ing in it,
² and the marginal diﬀerential treatment eﬀect4 (MTE), which identiﬁes the
eﬀect of participating in a PRP on those individuals who are indiﬀerent
between participation in a PRP or PUP for a given value of UD = u.
The ﬁrst parameter I consider is the average eﬀect of treatment of a person se-
lected randomly from the population. Given the value of X, the average treatment
eﬀect is equal to
4
ATE(x) ´ E[4jX = x]: (4.5)
The second mean parameter of interest, the most commonly estimated param-
eter, is the mean treatment eﬀect on the treated:
4
ATT(x;z;D = 1) ´ E[4jX = x; Z = z; D = 1] (4.6)
= E[4jX = x;Z¯D ¸ UD]
The third parameter is the marginal treatment eﬀect parameter introduced by
Heckman (1997). The MTE parameter is deﬁned as
4
MTE(x;u) ´ E[4jX = x;UD = u]: (4.7)
4MTE(x;u) is the average of the eﬀect of those individuals who are indiﬀerent to
participate or not (those who are on the border) if the instrument is externally set
so that Z¯D = u. For small values of u, 4MTE(x;u) is the average eﬀect of those
who have characteristics that make them most likely to participate on a private
sector programme, while for large values of u, 4MTE(x;u) is the average eﬀect of
4For further connections between 4ATE and 4ATT with 4MTE see Heckman, Vytlacil (2002).4.1 Treatment parameters 37
those who are least likely to participate in a private sector programme because of
their characteristics.
If UD is independent from (U1;U0) then the three mean parameters above are
equal for X = x. This will not be the case in this paper, because participants in
private sector programmes are selected on the basis of unobserved characteristics
aﬀecting the employment outcome in the PRP or PUP state.
In this special case, with the outcome variable being dichotomous, the mean
parameters above take the following form:
4
ATE(x) = Pr[Y1 = 1jX = x] ¡ Pr[Y0 = 1jX = x]
= FU1(x¯1) ¡ FU0(x¯0)
4
ATT(x;z;D = 1) = Pr[Y1 = 1jX = x;Z = z;D = 1] ¡ :::




MTE(x;u) = Pr[Y1 = 1jX = x;UD = u] ¡ :::
::: ¡ Pr[Y0 = 1jX = x;UD = u]
= FU1 jUD(x¯1 ju) ¡ FU0 jUD(x¯0 ju)
where FUj jUD(tj jtD) = Pr[Uj · tj jUD = tD] for j = 0;1.
4.1.2 Distributional treatment parameters
For many questions, knowledge of distributional parameters is required. Does any-
body beneﬁt from the programme? Among those treated, what fraction is helped
by the programme and what fraction is hurt by it? I now consider diﬀerential
treatment parameters for the distribution of diﬀerential treatment eﬀects.38 The econometric model
In this special case, where the outcome variable is dichotomous and is generated
by an underlying linear latent index, with
4 = Y1 ¡ Y0 = 1(X¯1 ¸ U1) ¡ 1(X¯0 ¸ U0);
and where U1 6= U0, 4 can take three values:
1. 4 = 1 if the individual would have a successful outcome if treated (i.e.,
be employed if (s)he participates in a PRP) and an unsuccessful outcome
otherwise (Y0 = 0;Y1 = 1);
2. 4 = 0 if the individual would have a successful outcome in either state
(Y0 = 1;Y1 = 1), or the individual would have an unsuccessful outcome in
either state (Y0 = 0;Y1 = 0);
3. 4 = ¡1 if the individual would have a successful outcome if not treated
(i.e., be employed if participation in a PUP) and an unsuccessful outcome if
treated (Y0 = 1;Y1 = 0).
Consider, for example, 4 = 1, so that Y0 = 0;Y1 = 1. In this case:
E[4 = 1jX = x] = Pr[Y1 = 1;Y0 = 0jX = x]
= Pr[Y1 = 1jX = x] ¡ :::
::: ¡ Pr[Y1 = 1;Y0 = 1jX = x]
= FU1(x¯1) ¡ FU0;U1(x¯0;x¯1)
E[4 = 1jX = x;Z = z;D = 1] = Pr[Y1 = 1;Y0 = 0jX = x;Z = z;D = 1]
= Pr[D = 1jZ = z]
¡1 ¢ :::
::: ¢ Pr[Y1 = 1;Y0 = 0;D = 1jX = x;Z = z]




Pr[Y1 = 1;D = 1jX = x;Z = z] ¡ :::
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E[4 = 1jX = x;UD = u] = Pr[Y1 = 1;Y0 = 0jX = x;UD = u]
= Pr[Y1 = 1jX = x;UD = u] ¡ :::
::: ¡ Pr[Y1 = 1;Y0 = 1jX = x;UD = u]
= FU1jUD(x¯1ju) ¡ FU0;U1jD(x¯0;x¯1ju)
The corresponding parameters for 4 = 0 and 4 = ¡1 are deﬁned by straightfor-
ward modiﬁcation of the previous expressions5. Notice that
E[Y1 ¡ Y0jX = x] = E[4 = 1jX = x] ¡ E[4 = ¡1jX = x]
so that the average treatment eﬀect is the diﬀerence between two corresponding
distributional parameters: the probability of being successful (employed) when
participating in a PRP minus the probability of being unsuccessful when partici-
pating in a PRP. The distributional parameters oﬀer a ﬁner level of detail on the
eﬀectiveness of the programme.
There is a close connection between the mean treatment eﬀect, the distribution
of the treatment eﬀect and the joint distribution of (Y1;Y0;D). Once the joint
distribution is known, it is straightforward to calculate distributional parameters
and from these the mean treatment eﬀect. The inverse path is not generally
possible. Identiﬁcation of the distributional treatment parameters is anyway more
diﬃcult than identiﬁcation of the mean treatment eﬀect. Indeed, to identify the
mean treatment eﬀects, knowledge on the bivariate distributions FUD;U1 and FUD;U0
is only needed, as it has been shown in the expressions above. On the contrary,
identiﬁcation of the distributional treatment parameters requires knowledge of the
full trivariate distribution FUD;U0;U1. Since Y0 and Y1 are never jointly observed,
this trivariate distribution is not identiﬁed nonparametrically even when treatment
is exogenous.
However, the distribution of treatment eﬀect can be identiﬁed if additional
assumptions are made. I now discuss the assumption of a normal factor structure.
5See Appendix A for all the expressions.40 The econometric model
4.2 Factor structure model
In this empirical analysis I estimate a three equation model consisting of an equa-
tion for the decision rule, an outcome equation for the treated state, and an out-
come equation for the non-treated state. The selection outcome and the employ-
ment outcomes are discrete. In this paper I specify a discrete-choice, latent-index
framework where the unobservables are generated by a normal factor structure.
As before, the selection rule for treatment is (restoring the i subscripts):
D
¤
i = Zi¯D ¡ UDi
Di = 1 if D
¤
i ¸ 0 (4.8)
Di = 0 if D
¤
i < 0:
The following is the employment outcome equation for the treated state:
Y
¤
1i = Xi¯1 ¡ U1i
Y1i = 1 if Y
¤
1i ¸ 0 (4.9)
Y1i = 0 if Y
¤
1i < 0;
and the following is the employment outcome in the non-treated state:
Y
¤
0i = Xi¯0 ¡ U1i
Y0i = 1 if Y
¤
0i ¸ 0 (4.10)
Y0i = 0 if Y
¤
0i < 0:
It is assumed that the error terms in (4.8) - (4.10) are governed by the following
factor structure:
UDi = ¡®Dµ + ²Di
U1i = ¡®1µ + ²1i (4.11)
U0i = ¡®0µ + ²0i :4.2 Factor structure model 41
where I need to set ®D = 1 to reach identiﬁcation of the model6. I assume i.i.d.


















where I is the identity matrix (where I have imposed the normalization Var(µ)= 1,

































The assumption of a one factor structure is crucial to the identiﬁcation of






(recall we have scaled the variances of ²D;²1;²0 and µ all to be one, so that the
normalizing constants are known). Thus, identiﬁcation of ®0 and ®1 immediately
imply identiﬁcation of Cov(U0;U1) = ®1®0. Given joint normality, this implies that
the joint distribution UD;U1;U0 is known: no exclusion restrictions are required
and assumption (3) could be relaxed.
As it will be shown in the next chapters, I decided to run two speciﬁcation of
this model: one with selection only on observables characteristics and one with
selection also on unobservables. The former is obtained setting ®1 and ®0 to 0,
while in the latter the two factor loadings are set free. The exclusion restriction
6The factor structure assumption for discrete choice models produces a ﬂexible yet parsimo-
nious speciﬁcation, which yields convenient and easily interpretable expressions for the parame-
ters of interest and at the same time enables us to estimate the model in a tractable fashion.
7This is because ®D is set to 1.42 The econometric model
can be relaxed only in the model with selection also on unobservables (but I keep
it to improve the empirical identiﬁcation of the model), while it is necessary to get
convergence in the speciﬁcation with selection only on observables.
Let Φ denote the standard normal CDF and let Á denote the standard normal
probability density function. The following expressions for the mean treatment




[Φ(x¯1 + ®1µ) ¡ Φ(x¯0 + ®0µ)]Á(µ)dµ
4
ATT(x;z;D = 1) = [Φ(x¯1 + ®1µ) ¡ Φ(x¯0 + ®0µ)]Á(µ)d(µjx;z;D = 1)
=
Z
[Φ(x¯1 + ®1µ) ¡ Φ(x¯0 + ®0µ)]Á(µ)d(µjz;D = 1)
=
Z









[Φ(x¯1 + ®1µ) ¡ Φ(x¯0 + ®0µ)] ¢ :::




[Φ(x¯1 + ®1µ) ¡ Φ(x¯0 + ®0µ)]Á(µ)d(µjx;Z¯D = u)
=
Z













[Φ(x¯1 + ®1µ) ¡ Φ(x¯0 + ®0µ)]Á(u + µ)Á(µ)dµ
where to explicate the conditional distribution of µ I used the Bayes’ rule. Observe
that if ®1 = ®0, a common treatment eﬀect (conditional on X) for the indices of
(4.9) and (4.10) is to obtain.
The expressions for the distributional treatment parameters are easily derived.
For example, the distributional parameters in this case for the event 4 = 1 (which
is equivalent to (Y0 = 0;Y1 = 1)) are:
E[4 = 1jX = x] =
Z
[Φ(x¯1 + ®1µ)(1 ¡ Φ(x¯0 + ®0µ))]Á(µ)dµ
E[4 = 1jX = x;Z = z;D = 1] = Φ(z¯D=
p
2)
¡1 ¢ ::: (continue)4.3 Estimating the Mixture Model 43
::: ¢
Z
[Φ(x¯1 + ®1µ)(1 ¡ Φ(x¯0 + ®0µ))Φ(z¯D + µ)]Á(µ)dµ








[Φ(x¯1 + ®1µ)(1 ¡ Φ(x¯0 + ®0µ)]Á(u + µ)Á(µ)dµ
4.3 Estimating the Mixture Model
Conditioning on µ, and restoring the i subscript, the likelihood function for the







Pr[Di = 1jZi;µi] = Φ(Zi¯D + µi)
Pr[Yi = 1jDi = 1;Xi;µi] = Pr[Y1i = 1jDi = 1;Xi;µi]
= Pr[Y1i = 1jXi;µi]
= Φ(Xi¯1 + ®1µi)
Pr[Yi = 1jDi = 0;Xi;µi] = Pr[Y0i = 1jDi = 0;Xi;µi]
= Pr[Y0i = 1jXi;µi]
= Φ(Xi¯0 + ®0µi):
Since µ is unobserved I need to integrate over its domain to account for its existence,
assuming that µ?(X;Z). Since the probabilities in the likelihood function are
conditioned on µ, an unobserved factor essential for the selection into programmes,44 The econometric model
I have (Y1;Y0)?(DjX;Z;µ) which implies that Pr[YjijDji;Xi;µi] = Pr[YjijXi;µi].
This means that both the selection probabilities and the outcome probabilities are
unconditional probabilities in the likelihood function.






Identiﬁcation of the parameters of the model, (¯D;¯1;¯0) and (®1;®0), is assured
by the joint normality assumption for ²D;²1;²0 and µ. Parameters are estimated
by maximum likelihood, where I use a Gaussian quadrature to approximate the
integrated likelihood8.
Given identiﬁcation of the parameters of the model, all mean and distributional
treatment eﬀect parameters are identiﬁed and standard errors for the treatment
parameters follow from the delta method (see e.g. Ruud (2000)). I integrate these
estimated treatment parameters against the empirical distribution of X and Z to
estimate the corresponding treatment parameters integrated over the distribution




where N is the sample size.
4.3.1 Heckman-Singer procedure
If the analyst knew µ, then the matching conditions of Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) would be satisﬁed:
(Y0;Y1)?DjX;Z;µ
and
0 < Pr[D = 1jX;Z;µ] < 1;
where the latter assumption follows from the assumption that Var(²D) = 1 and
normality. Thus given µ, it would be possible to use simple propensity score match-
ing or other standard matching methods to estimate ATT and ATE. However,
matching does not identify MTE or the distributional parameters.
8See next subsection and Appendix B.4.3 Estimating the Mixture Model 45
Given that I do not observe µ, this strategy is not available. Accordingly, I
integrate out µ assuming that
µ?(X;Z):
Another approach to the problem of missing conditioning variable is to assume
diﬀerent values of the missing µ value and to perform a sensitivity analysis. Sev-
eral methods exist where a distributional shape for the ﬁxed eﬀect is assumed, and
then the eﬀect is integrated out of the likelihood function. Heckman and Singer
(1984) propose a procedure that abstracts from the assumption of a speciﬁc para-
metric representation of the distribution of the ﬁxed eﬀect by allowing for a partial
parametric speciﬁcation. This speciﬁcation allows the unknown distribution to be
represented non-parametrically by a step function. In this manner the probability
density function is approximated by a discrete distribution with a ﬁnite number
of points of support, and estimates are made for the location and density of each
point. The exact number of points of support is determined by beginning with
one support (i.e. no heterogeneity) and working upward until the likelihood fails
to improve signiﬁcantly.
In this model I use three points. Let v1, v2 and v3 be the three points of
support (with v1 < v2 < v3) and p1, p2 and p3 the associated probabilities (with





v3 = v1 ¡
1
p1v1
Since it is possible to derive p3 as a diﬀerence of probabilities, the only additional
parameters to calculate (if compared to the model with the normally distributed
common factor) are p1 and p2.
Although the distribution of the ﬁxed eﬀect is not likely to be well characterized
by the step function, Heckman and Singer (1984) have shown that the coeﬃcients
of the explanatory variables can be estimated with great precision.46 The econometric model







Pr[Di;YijXi;Zi;vij] ¢ pj :
The correspondent expressions for the characterizing probabilities are:
Pr[Di;YijXi;Zi;vij] = Pr[DijZi;vij]Pr[YijDi;Xi;vij];
and
Pr[Di = 1jZi;vij] = Φ(Zi¯D + vij)
Pr[Yi = 1jDi = 1;Xi;vij] = Pr[Y1i = 1jDi = 1;Xi;vij]
= Pr[Y1i = 1jXi;vij]
= Φ(Xi¯1 + ®1vij)
Pr[Yi = 1jDi = 0;Xi;vij] = Pr[Y0i = 1jDi = 0;Xi;vij]
= Pr[Y0i = 1jXi;vij]
= Φ(Xi¯0 + ®0vij):Chapter 5
The data
The data used in this dissertation are taken from the dataset The register for
Analyses relating to the Social Responsibility of Enterprises. This is a large panel
dataset constructed by The Danish National Institute of Social Research in col-
laboration with Statistics Denmark, through the merging of several administrative
registers (the merging variable is the civil registration number1). It contains a 10%
random sample representative of the Danish population in the 17-66 age group;
hence immigrants and refugees are only included in the dataset from the moment
they register at the National Civil Register. The dataset is updated every year
and at present it is possible to follow the individuals in the sample for the period
1984-2000.
I did not use the entire sample to run my analyses since there were a number
of conditions to be met ﬁrst2.
The ﬁrst requirement was that an unemployed worker had to ﬁnish the ALMP
1The civil registration number - CPR number - is a personal identiﬁcation code given to all
citizens or guests with a valid residence permit, after registering at the National Civil Register.
Because of this, Denmark has a very transparent and eﬃcient public system. The National Civil
Register automatically supplies other public units with information, e.g. your change of address,
and it is linked to the police, social services, the tax oﬃce and public health services. In practice,
a person needs to have a CPR number to be covered by the Danish health insurance, to obtain
a library card, to sign up for an evening class, to pay taxes and open a bank account.
2The ﬁnal sample I use was manipulated by Brian Krogh Graversen and Peter Jensen in their
previous studies, so all the restrictions mentioned below were made by them.48 The data
programme in the period 1994-1998: the low bound is due to a change in the regula-
tion in 1994, while the second is necessary to allow observation of the employment
state of participants after programme completion. Besides, even if individuals
may have taken part in more than one programme I will take into consideration
only the ﬁrst one (otherwise, a multiple spell duration model would be needed, to
shape the length of each spell). Moreover, there are two further issues: individuals
categorized as participants in job training programmes and overlapping periods
programmes.
² A large fraction of about 2% of the welfare recipients participating in job
training programmes in the public sector have been erroneously registered in
programmes arranged by the public employment service (maybe due to an
oversight of some municipality). Given that the number of these misreported
records is really small, I decided to exclude them from the sample.
² Some programmes are cut up into smaller sub-periods with intervening pe-
riods where the programme participants do not take part in the programme,
while other programmes overlap. To solve this problem, the two diﬀerent
programmes are counted as one if the time between them is less than one
week or overlapping and the type of programme is the same; if this is not
the case, then only the ﬁrst programme according to time is chosen3.
As a second restriction I focus my attention on men aged 18-59, excluding
immigrants and refugees from countries outside EU and North-America, who are
likely to have remarkably diﬀerent personal characteristics and behaviour. I only
keep men for reasons of simplicity: it would be far more complicated to model
women, possibly because of hidden interactions with household composition and
behaviour.
Finally, a number of other restrictions are made to guarantee all necessary
information for my purposes; in particular, I keep only the information for PRPs
and PUPs participants, so that throughout the rest of the paper when I use ALMPs
3To determine whether two programmes are of the same type Graversen and Jensen used a
ﬁner categorization than the one used in the text.49
Restrictions Observations
Individuals who ended an ALMP during 1994-1998 20,105
Restricted to ALMP starting in 1993 or later 20,060
Restricted to ALMP with length between 2 weeks and 5 years 18,454
Individuals with missing basic information excluded 18,339
Restricted to men 9,193
Immigrants and refugees excluded 7,841
Restricted to age 18-59 when starting ALMP 7,181
Restricted to individuals with information for all years include
1 year before and after the programme period 6,987
Individuals in public sector employment programmes
with missing data excluded 6,822
Individuals from municipalities with less than 10
ALMP participants excluded 6,613
To keep private and public sector programmes participants 2,651
Table 5.1: Dataset’s restrictions.
I intend only PRPs and PUPs. Table (5.1) reports all the detailed restrictions.
The ﬁnal sample is made up of 2,651 observations, 1,391 of which are private
sector programmes participants (¼ 52%) and 1,260 are public sector programmes
participants (¼ 48%).
In the original dataset there is no information about the monthly employment
state of individuals, but there is information on almost all the income-compensating
beneﬁts paid to them (including welfare, unemployment beneﬁts, leave scheme
beneﬁts, rehabilitation beneﬁts, beneﬁts received while in an ALMP, disability
pension, early-retirement pay). Therefore, the employment history of the sample
can be deduced through the beneﬁts received.50 The data
5.1 Variables
The model used in this study is a discrete choice model with one equation se-
lecting individuals for participation in a private or a public programme and two
employment state equations, one for each type of programme.
The dependent variable for the ﬁrst equation is a dummy which equals 1 if the
individual participated in a private programme and 0 if the individual participated
in a public programme. For both the employment state equations, the dependent
variables are dummies with value 1 if the individual is employed and 0 otherwise.
I decided to use three diﬀerent time horizons for this variable, namely 6, 12 and 24
months after the end of the programme. This means that we can check whether
there are diﬀerences over a period of time in the impact of the programme (in
some senses, I try to construct a sort of “discrete trend”).
The regressors used in the three equations are the same, except from an addi-
tional instrument added in the selection equation4, and are divided into two main
groups: individual and municipality characteristics.
² The former include: marital state, year when the programme started, pres-
ence of children, age, level of education, years of work experience, fraction
of time spent by the individual in diﬀerent employment states during the 12
months before and during the period 12-36 months preceding the programme;
² in the latter I include: the number of residents in the municipality in which
the individual lives and a measure of the regional unemployment rate rela-
tive to the countrywide unemployment rate. The size of the municipality is
important because it can act as a proxy for numerous unobserved characteris-
tics. It is reasonable to think that the smaller the city, the smaller the group
of programmes to choose from or that even caseworkers may be inﬂuenced
by the size of the municipality when assigning individuals to diﬀerent pro-
grammes or again that the problems of welfare recipients in big cities may be
diﬀerent from the problems of recipients in smaller cities. The regional un-
employment rate relative to the countrywide counterpart is used to account
4I discussed identiﬁcation problems in Chapter 4.5.1 Variables 51
for diﬀerences in local labour markets (some regions may have a higher un-
employment rate than others, rather than the ratio vacant jobs/potential
applicants5).
As anticipated on Chapter 4, I introduce an additional instrument in the se-
lection equation, i.e. the use of PRP programmes in each municipality relative to












it is the number of individuals participating in a PRP programme in
the municipality where individual i lives in year t, N
(ALMP)
it is the number of par-
ticipants starting a PRP or a PUP programme in the same municipality in the
same year, NPRP
t is the number of PRP participants in the whole country in year
t and N
(ALMP)
t is the number of participants starting a PRP or a PUP programme
in the country in year t. Obviously, Wit takes the same value for individuals living
in the same municipality.
To be a valid instrument the local treatment intensity should have a direct eﬀect
on the selection process but no direct inﬂuence on the employment outcome after
the programme: the only eﬀect on the employment outcome should be via partic-
ipation to the programme itself. As I made clear in Section 4.2, there is no need
to introduce an additional instrument to reach identiﬁcation in the model speci-
ﬁcation with selection on both observable and unobservable characteristics, but I
decided to use it to improve the identiﬁcation power of the model (hence to de-
crease standard errors); on the other hand, the additional instrument is necessary
in the speciﬁcation with selection only on observables.
5The labour market regions used in this study are identical to the commuting areas deﬁned
by the Ministry of Environment and Energy (2001). These commuting areas are formed in such
a way that a relatively large fraction of the residents in a given region work within the region.
During the sample period there were 275 municipality in Denmark grouped into 45 commuting
areas. The unemployment rate for each region is calculated on an annual basis.52 The data
However, there would be a problem of endogeneity, if I included the variable
as deﬁned above in the model. If individual i participates in a programme (it does
not matter if a PRP or PUP) during year t, this fact will have an impact on Wit
(since the numerator and/or denominator of the variable would change). This is a
problem since I use this variable to explain individual’s i choice of the programme
during year t.
To solve this endogeneity problem I decided to use Wi(t+2) instead of Wit. In this
way if individual i starts a programme during year t, this does not have any impact
on Wi(t+2) since this variable refers to two years later6. Of course, to be a good
instrument W should have some degree of correlation over time. It is reasonable
to assume that municipalities with a high proportion of PRP programmes in one
year should have a high proportion of the same programmes in the surrounding
years.
A more obvious method would have been to lag the variable Wit, e.g. by one
period. But the data used to form the instrumental variable are available only
from 1995, so if I take a one period lagged version of it I can construct the variable
only for individuals starting a programme in the period 1996-1998, hence facing a
missing data problem for period 1993-1995.
Finally, a brief explanation of the last restriction imposed to the sample in
Table (5.1). In some municipalities very few individuals participate in ALMPs.
This could be because of the very small size of the city or because there are
few ALMP programmes in that city or again because of very little use of active
programmes by the caseworkers when assigning individuals. Anyway, I decided to
exclude these individuals from such municipalities because W may not be a good
measure of the probability of being assigned in an ALMP programme.
6I do not use Wi(t+1) because the average duration of a programme is about 6 months (Gra-
versen, 2004), so an individual starting a programme in the second semester of year t may also
aﬀect Wi(t+1).5.2 Descriptive statistics 53
5.2 Descriptive statistics
The ﬁnal sample size is 2,651 individuals: 1,391 participated in a private sector
programme while 1,260 in a public sector programme. The sample size for both
groups, besides being almost equal, is big enough to make reliable results.
I run the model using three diﬀerent time horizons for the employment state
outcome: 6, 12 and 24 months after the end of the programme. Looking at the
raw data, the proportion of employed individuals among those participating in
a private sector programme is always more than 50%, decreasing as time elapses.
This is because some individuals turn from employment to unemployment or other
states (out of labour force, training, classroom training, etc.). On the other hand,
only approximately one third of the public sector participants are employed after
the end of the programme: 34% after 6 months, more than 37% after 12 months
and slightly less than 37% after 2 years. So PRP participants face a decrease
in their employment probability, while PUP participants see their proportion of
employed slightly increase as time passes.
For the unobservables, in both categories more than three quarters of the sam-
ple are single, the PUPs percentage being higher, while PRPs have a higher fraction
of individuals married or cohabitating. This could be part of the reason why most
private sector participants are parents (13% vs. 8%).
Age and education composition of the individuals from both groups are the same.
More than a half are young people within the age 17-24, a small part are between
50-66, while the remaining is almost equally divided into the other age classes.
The same trend is seen in the education composition: almost 60% completed pri-
mary or lower secondary school, while a triﬂing percentage have a high level of
education.
The majority of the individuals in the sample has a very short work experience
(under 2 years), 52% of the PRP participants and 64% of the PUP participants;
but still a signiﬁcant proportion has more than 10 years, in both categories. Look-
ing at the employment state preceding the programme period, PRP participants
seem to have spent more time in employment than PUP participants (on average7),
7On average because the values taken from this variable are proportions.54 The data
specially in the period 12-36 months previous to the programme start (this may
indicate a more constant working life for those participating in PRPs). During the
year preceding the programme in both groups a large fraction of individuals was
unemployed, when just less than one ﬁfth in ordinary education. This composition
slightly changes in the two year period starting 3 years before the programme8:
PRP participants are almost equally divided into employed and unemployed, while
in PUP takers there were more unemployed than employed. The proportion of pro-
gramme participants who were in ordinary education is almost the same, around
10%.
Looking at the municipality size, the percentages of people living in cities and
towns with less than 40,000 inhabitants are the same for private and public sector
participants. In municipalities with more than 40,000 inhabitants, it seems that
PUP programmes are more used in cities with more than 100,000 citizens than in
the class 40,000-100,000: a possible explanation for this is that the bigger the city,
the bigger the number of public organizations.
From the variable measuring the regional unemployment rate relative to the
countrywide rate, both categories of programme participants have a higher unem-
ployment rate than the countrywide average (on average7). This diﬀerence is three
times bigger for individuals taking part in public sector programmes than for those
participating in private sector one. Again, this may be because PUP participants
are more likely to live in very big cities, where the unemployment rate is likely to
be higher.
Finally an overview on the instrument used in the selection equation. As shown
in the ﬁrst table, in those municipalities where PRP participants come from, there
is (on average7) a 22% use of PRP programmes more than the country average;
however the standard deviation for this value is pretty big and its distribution is
positively skewed, meaning that in some municipalities this proportion is much
bigger, or equivalently, a lot of PRPs are used contrary to very few PUPs. For
public sector participants (second table), the local treatment intensity is even
higher than the countrywide rate, but in this case the value is smaller (+8%).
8For around 30% of the sample there is no information available for this variable.5.2 Descriptive statistics 55





10% .4801511 0 Obs 1391
25% .7656333 0 Sum of Wgt. 1391
50% 1.140944 Mean 1.221794
Largest Std. Dev. .6682782
75% 1.564143 3.887946
90% 2.045732 3.887946 Variance .4465958
95% 2.400755 3.951519 Skewness 1.328568
99% 3.867712 4.301393 Kurtosis 6.065143
-------------------------------------------------------------





10% .3561862 0 Obs 1260
25% .6731681 0 Sum of Wgt. 1260
50% .9940348 Mean 1.078865
Largest Std. Dev. .5942874
75% 1.359559 3.291703
90% 1.887783 3.331726 Variance .3531775
95% 2.17182 4.909912 Skewness .9765608
99% 2.82146 4.915878 Kurtosis 5.83666
-------------------------------------------------------------56 The data
Once again the standard deviation is quite big and the distribution positively
skewed.
If the mean value for PRPs is not unexpected, what the PUPs value reveals
is a broad use of PRPs even in those municipalities where the PUP participants
live9.
9It would have been interesting to see the proportion of PUPs relative to the countrywide
rate but it was not possible to construct this information from the original dataset.Chapter 6
Results
As already pointed out, the aim of this study is to estimate the diﬀerential treat-
ment eﬀect of private sector (PRP) and public sector programmes (PUP) aimed
at welfare recipients, respectively, and to ascertain whether there exist some dif-
ference between the eﬀects of the two programmes.
To do this I use the latent variable model of Aakvik et al. (2000), characterized by
three equations - one selecting people into the two programme types and the other
two predicting the employment state after the end of both programmes - with dis-
crete outcomes to take selection on observable characteristics and a common factor
structure on the equations errors to take selection on unobservable characteristics.
I specify two versions of the model:
² one version with selection only on observables, i.e. with the two factor load-
ings relative to the employment equations set to 0 and
² a version with selection also on unobservables, i.e. with the two factor load-
ings free to vary1.
For each version, the eﬀects of the two programme types have been calculated for
three time horizons, i.e. 6, 12 and 24 months after the end of the programme.
Thus, it is possible to see how the treatment varies over time, if e.g. private sector
1For both versions, the factor loading relative to the selection equation is set to 1 because of
identiﬁcation issues.58 Results
programmes are more eﬃcient than public sector programmes in helping people to
ﬁnd a job and, if so, whether there is a development over time for the eﬀectiveness
of this programme.
Another characteristic of this study is the possibility for the treatment eﬀects to
vary among individuals. Hence, in addition to the coeﬃcient estimates, I report
three mean treatment eﬀects - i.e. the average treatment eﬀect (ATE), the treat-
ment eﬀect on the treated (ATT) and the marginal treatment eﬀect (MTE) - and
their distribution. In the speciﬁcations where there is allowance for selection on
the unobservables, the additional instrument is externally set so that Z¯ = u can
gain three diﬀerent values and MTE can be calculated concentrating each time
on those individuals more or less likely to be selected into PRPs (See Chapter
4). Additional information on the treatment heterogeneity can be gained from the
marginal eﬀects on the mean treatment eﬀects. Full results for the various models
are reported in Appendix D Tables A.1-A.7 to F.1-F.7.
The most satisfactory model is the one also with selection on unobservables,
since it allows for a more ﬂexible structure of the error terms across equations.
Based on this speciﬁcation, I run two tests of hypothesis: the additional instru-
ment’s validity and the common factor’s normality test.
To be a valid instrument, the use of PRPs relative to the countrywide average has
to correlate with the assignment into programme categories: this is shown again in
Tables A.1-A.7 to F.1-F.7 as the coeﬃcient of the relevant variable in the selection
equation. A second requirement is that it should not correlate directly with the
employment state outcome: to test this, I run the model with the instrumental
variable also in the two outcome equations (again for each time horizon) and its
coeﬃcient should not be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The results are reported
in Tables G.1-G.3 to I.1-I.3.
As explained in Chapter 4, it is not necessary to add an additional instrument
in presence of a normal factor structure (which I added anyway to improve the
identiﬁcation of the model). Tables J.1-J.3 to L.1-L.3 display the estimates of the
model without the additional instrument.
Finally, a robustness test on the common factor’s normality hypothesis has been6.1 Coeﬃcient estimates 59
performed. Tables M.1-M.7 to O.1-O.7 report the results for the model with the
Heckman-Singer discrete distribution.
6.1 Coeﬃcient estimates
The estimated parameters of the selection equation show clearly that participants
in the two programmes are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent with respect to observable char-
acteristics2 (see Tables A.1, B.1, C.1, D.1, E.1, F.1). Hence caseworkers assign
individuals to diﬀerent programmes basing their decisions on several attributes.
People married or cohabitating, with more than 2 years of work experience, living
in municipalities where PRPs are more important and those who spent a large
fraction of time in employment during the two years period starting three years
before the programme, have a higher probability of being assigned into private
sector programmes, while individuals with a higher education degree and living
in regions where the unemployment rate is higher have more probability to be
assigned to public sector programmes.
Besides, the estimates of the programme starting year dummies show a decreas-
ing trend in the probability of being assigned into a private sector programme, since
they diminish from 1993 to 1998: at the same time the probability of being as-
signed into PRPs for claimants starting the programme during 1993 was almost
twice as much as the probability of being assigned into PUPs, in 1998 this relative
chance was reversed and was twice as less.
Looking at the employment equations, I now decide to focus basically on the
model which allows for selection on the unobservables (Tables B.2-B.3, D.2-D.3,
F.2-F.3; anyway, I will comment some diﬀerences with respect to the non-selection
version). Some characteristics have an impact on both the PRP and PUP em-
ployment outcomes and, apart from a few cases, all of these signiﬁcant variables
maintain their inﬂuence with time. Younger people, people with higher educational
degrees, people with more work experience and people who spent less time in un-
employment have a signiﬁcantly higher probability of being employed after the end
2This is obviously true for all the three time horizon speciﬁcations, irrespective whether there
is selection on the unobservables or not.60 Results
of the programme. This is consistent with the results obtained by Graversen and
Jensen (2004) in a recent study where they use the same model to investigate the
impact of private sector programmes relative to all other types of ALMP. From
the estimates, it is seen that the older the person the lower the probability of
being employed and the more work experience the higher the probability of being
employed. Furthermore, living in big cities, in regions with little unemployment
rate and having children are characteristics positively inﬂuencing the probability
of ﬁnding a job after the end of the programme.
Considering the three diﬀerent time horizons, there seems to be some diﬀerence
with time, in the sense that for each time, apart from some characteristics inﬂuenc-
ing constantly, there are diﬀerent variables having an inﬂuence on the probability
to get a job. But the 12 month version has a further diﬀerence with the other two
time horizons, specially in the public sector employment equation (Table D.3):
only four estimates are statistically diﬀerent from zero, and just at a 10% level.
Comparing the selection-on-unobservables version of the model with the ver-
sion without selection allowance (Tables A.2-A.3, C.2-C.3, E.2-E.3), the coeﬃcient
estimates are very similar: this is in accordance with the fact that the loadings
of the common factor in the model with selection are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. This means that controlling for unobservables allows for a more ﬂex-
ible structure, but does not change appreciably the coeﬃcient estimation results.
However, it does increase the estimated standard errors in the public programme
employment outcome: this is the main reason why several variables fail to be
signiﬁcant when controlling for selection on unobservables.
6.2 Mean treatment eﬀects
Based on the coeﬃcient estimates presented above, I calculate the diﬀerential treat-
ment eﬀects using the formulas given in Appendix A. I start with the diﬀerential
average treatment eﬀect (ATE):6.2 Mean treatment eﬀects 61
4ATE Without selection With selection
on unobservables on unobservables
6 months .171 *** .021
12 months .127 *** .057
24 months .115 *** .119
Looking at the raw data (see Appendix C), PRP participants have a 20.35 percent-
age points higher employment rate than PUP participants, when their employment
state is compared 6 months after the end of the programme. This advantage falls
to 15.9 and 14.36 percentage points, respectively, 12 and 24 months after the end
of the programme.
When controlling for the observable characteristics, the negative trend does
not change, even though values are smaller. After 6 months, a randomly selected
PRP participant has 17.1 percentage points higher employment rate than a PUP
participants and this diﬀerence is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero; the diﬀerence
decreases to 12.7 and 11.5 respectively 12 and 24 months after, although always
strongly signiﬁcant.
If I further control for selection on unobservables, then this diﬀerence is much
smaller for the 6 and 12 months, while it basically does not change for the 24
months. But, more important, the diﬀerential eﬀect fail to be signiﬁcant. So the
ﬁrst evidence is the importance of controlling also for unobservable characteristics:
the average treatment eﬀect is smaller and the trend is inverted if compared with
the model without selection on unobservables. On average, the probability of being
employed after the end of the programme for private sector participants is higher
than for public sector participants and there is an increase of this probability over
time.
The results for the treated (ATT) are even more surprising:
4ATT Without selection With selection
on unobservables on unobservables
6 months .179 *** -.049
12 months .137 *** -.149
24 months .124 *** .01762 Results
In the version where only control on the observables is performed, PRPs advantage
persists: estimates are fairly bigger (meaning that the treated beneﬁt more from
participating), they diﬀer signiﬁcantly from zero and follow a negative trend with
time. This casts new light on the eﬃciency of the caseworkers allocation. When
I control for the unobservables results change completely: the mean treatment
eﬀect on the treated becomes negative for the 6 and 12 month versions and pos-
itive (but really close to zero) for the 24 month version, though not statistically
signiﬁcant. The smaller estimates suggest that those treated are not those (on
average) expected to gain more from the programme, but those expected to gain
less (specially 12 months after the end of the programme) and, moreover, they are
penalized. The big diﬀerence between the mean raw eﬀect and the 4ATT shows
the importance of controlling for observed and unobserved characteristics, even if
the factor loadings estimates are not signiﬁcant (the reason of this non-signiﬁcance
is the standard errors size, not the small estimate). This result is similar to the
results obtained by Graversen and Jensen (2004) and other studies based on the
same model3.
The results above highlights the importance of controlling also for the unob-
servable characteristics. Now, in the model with allowance for selection on un-
observables, the calculations of the mean marginal treatment eﬀect (MTE) for
diﬀerent values of Z¯ = u allow a better understanding of the role of the unob-
servables. This index reports the treatment eﬀect for those people on the border
between being assigned into a private or a public sector programme (a value of Z¯
slightly bigger than u would make individual i to be selected into a PRP, while a
value slightly smaller would make her/him to be selected into a PUP); so, setting
diﬀerent values of u it is possible to investigate how the treatment varies for people
more or less likely to be selected into a private sector programme, the smaller the
value of u the more likely the participation in a PRP programme. I calculate the
4MTE parameters for three values of u:
3See e.g. Andr´ en and Andr´ en (2002) or Aakvik et al. (2003).6.3 Distributional treatment eﬀect 63
4MTE UD = ¡2 UD = 0 UD = 2
6 months -.126 .023 .166
12 months -.344 .056 .46
24 months -.089 .122 .324
The estimation results (even though not signiﬁcant) reveal an increasing trend of
the 4MTE in UD: individuals most likely to be selected into private sector pro-
grammes are penalized from participating, while individuals with characteristics
which make them least likely to be selected beneﬁt the most from participating.
This diﬀerence persists with time and becomes bigger after 12 months.
Hence, the mean MTE agrees with what is suggested by the ATE and ATT
mean eﬀects since they also reported that a randomly selected individual would
be better oﬀ than an actual participant in PRPs.
6.3 Distributional treatment eﬀect
As described in Chapter 4, the model used in this study allows the impact to vary
among individuals, hence accounting for possible heterogeneity in the population.
Tables B.4, D.4 and F.4 report the distributional impacts for randomly se-
lected participants obtained using the speciﬁcation which allows selection on the
unobservables after 6, 12 and 24 months, respectively. For the ﬁrst two time hori-
zons, almost the same fraction of individuals will beneﬁt and will be hurt from
participating in PRP programmes, while around half of the population will not be
aﬀected by the type of programme since they will be employed or not regardless
of which type of programme they participate in. On the contrary, 24 months after
the end of the programme, participants beneﬁting will be almost twice as many
as those being hurt by it. Diﬀerently from the 4ATE, all these probabilities are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Looking at the treatment eﬀect on the treated, the story does not change
so much. The majority of the population will be unaﬀected by the type of the
programme, while the others will be equally divided into those who beneﬁt and
those hurt by participating in PRPs. As before, there is one time horizon diﬀerent64 Results
from the others, but in this case is the 12 months: those being hurt are twice as
many as those who beneﬁt from PRPs. In any case, only the estimates for those
not aﬀected are signiﬁcant at a 1% level.
As for the mean treatment eﬀects, the last parameters I consider are those
for the marginal treatment eﬀect: it is possible to see who beneﬁts the most
from participating just comparing the parameters for diﬀerent values of UD = u.
The distributional treatment eﬀects for individuals with a value of unobservable
characteristics that make them most likely to participate in PRPs (low u-values)
give the same information of the ATT parameters. As the u-values increase, i.e. for
individuals less and less likely to take private sector programmes, the probability
of beneﬁtting from participating increases, the probability of getting hurt by the
programme decreases while the fraction of people unaﬀected by the programme
remains substantially constant. Diﬀerences among the population seem to be
bigger for the 12 months employment state: for individuals most likely to get a
PRP, almost half of them will be hurt by the participation, at the same time less
than 10% will beneﬁt. On the contrary, for individuals least likely to participate,
more than half will beneﬁt from it and only 7.6% will be hurt. As well as for ATE
and ATT distributional parameters, the majority of people have no advantage from
participating in a private sector programme instead of a public sector programme
(this can be seen looking at the estimates of Pr
MTE





Y1;Y0(1;1;x;u), which, besides, are the only ones always signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero).
Thanks to the model speciﬁcation, it has been shown that there is a consider-
able amount of heterogeneity in the impact of the programmes; besides, it is now
clear that the mean treatment eﬀects, namely those most commonly estimated,
hide all this heterogeneity in the individual responses.
6.4 Selection on observables and unobservables
Looking at the mean and distributional diﬀerential eﬀects parameters, there is a
considerable amount of heterogeneity in the population with respect to the re-
sponse to the programmes. A less sophisticated index for this heterogeneity could6.4 Selection on observables and unobservables 65




6 months .021 .104 -.049 .11
12 months .057 .097 -.149 .091
24 months .119 .097 .017 .106
Regardless of the time horizon, the empirical standard deviation of the mean treat-
ment eﬀect and the mean treatment eﬀect on the treated are quite big; they show
that the impact of participating in a private sector programme can vary consider-
ably, for both a randomly selected individual and a treated person.
Once proved that there is a certain amount of heterogeneity in treatment ef-
fects, it would be interesting to know which individual or municipality character-
istics inﬂuence the treatment: this can be seen looking at the marginal eﬀects of





@z ], respectively. There seem to be no constant inﬂuence with time, in the
sense that some variables have a diﬀerent impact on the 4 treatments in diﬀerent
time horizons4. For the 6 month unemployment state model, being older than 24
and living in a city with more than 100,000 citizens are associated with much bigger
4 treatment eﬀects, while having children, having more than 10 years of work ex-
perience, having spent the largest part of the last 12 months in ordinary education
and having started the programme in 1997 are connected with very small 4 treat-
ment eﬀects. The eﬀect 12 months after the end of the programme is diﬀerently
inﬂuenced by these variables: now, individuals who worked for more than 5 years,
who started the programme during 1995, 1996 but above all in 1998, and who live
in big cities, beneﬁt more by the programme; while, living in a region where there
is a high unemployment rate is associated with a much smaller treatment eﬀect.
Finally, the 24 months employment state seems to be inﬂuenced in the same way
as the 6 months state: older and better educated individuals, starting the pro-
gramme in 1998 and living in regions with a higher unemployment rate, gain more
from the programme than individuals married or cohabitating, with more than
2 years of work experience and who were not employed in the years before the
4See Tables B.7, D.7 and F.7 for all the estimates.66 Results
programme. So, even though some characteristics inﬂuence the treatment eﬀects
varies with time, if these traits were taken into consideration by caseworkers when
allocating individuals in diﬀerent programmes, such programmes would be much
more eﬃcient by having the highest eﬀects on individuals most likely to gain from
them.
To gain further knowledge on which extent observable and unobservable char-
acteristics for selection and employment outcome are connected, I calculated some
correlations. The factor structure model and the assumption that (UD,U1) and
(UD,U0) are independent of (Z,X) imply very simple formulas to calculate corre-





















For the 6 months employment state these correlations are:
Corr6 months(U0;U1) = 0:078
Corr6 months(UD;U0) = 0:382
Corr6 months(UD;U1) = 0:102
From the ﬁrst correlation, unobservable characteristics determining employment
in PRP takers are not correlated with unobservable characteristics determining
employment in PUP takers: the estimate is positive but close to zero. From the
latter two correlations, the unobservables determining selection into private sector
programmes are positively correlated with unobservables determining employment
in both kinds of programme participants, Corr 6 months(UD;U0) being almost four
times as big as Corr6 months(UD;U1): individuals with high values of UD (thus
those least likely to participate in a private sector programme) are likely to have
unobserved characteristics negatively inﬂuencing their employment state after the
programme, regardless of which programme they participate in, but less likely to6.4 Selection on observables and unobservables 67
be unemployed if they are PRP participants (given the values of X and Z). For
the 12 months version, things are slightly diﬀerent:
Corr12 months(U0;U1) = ¡0:261
Corr12 months(UD;U0) = 0:461
Corr12 months(UD;U1) = ¡0:283
The correlation between U0 and U1 is negative, meaning that individuals with
unobservables which make them more likely to be employed if participating in a
private sector programme have unobservables which make them less likely to get
a job if they participate in a public sector programme: this diﬀerence between
selected and non-selected individuals with respect to the employment state after
the end of the programme makes clear once again that it is necessary to con-
trol for both unobservable and observable characteristics. Secondly, correlations
between unobservables promoting selection into PRPs and each employment out-
come have opposite signs: individuals least likely to be selected into PRPs are
those least likely to be employed after a public sector programme and most likely
to employed after a private sector programme. This shows a perverse selection on
unobservables: people assigned to a certain type of programme are those beneﬁt-
ing the least from that type of programme.
The same conclusions can be derived from the correlation on the 24 months spec-
iﬁcation:
Corr24 months(U0;U1) = ¡0:074
Corr24 months(UD;U0) = 0:177
Corr24 months(UD;U1) = ¡0:21
Here, even though values are smaller than before, estimates show the same dis-
torted selection rule.
After having considered how unobservable characteristics aﬀect the selection
and employment outcomes, it may be useful to know if observables have the same
impact. Again, I examine the dependence among Z¯D, X¯0 and X¯1 using corre-68 Results
lations5. Unlike before, indices are all positively correlated to each other:
Corr6 months(X¯0;X¯1) = 0:829
Corr6 months(Z¯D;X¯0) = 0:413
Corr6 months(Z¯D;X¯1) = 0:433
Corr12 months(X¯0;X¯1) = 0:797
Corr12 months(Z¯D;X¯0) = 0:501
Corr12 months(Z¯D;X¯1) = 0:265
Corr24 months(X¯0;X¯1) = 0:778
Corr24 months(Z¯D;X¯0) = 0:315
Corr24 months(Z¯D;X¯1) = 0:259
Thus, unlike what arises in the analysis of unobservables, a higher index for par-
ticipation is associated with higher employment outcomes in both the private and
public sector programmes. Note that correlation between X¯0 and X¯1 is strong,
but they are not perfectly correlated, meaning that employment after one type
of programme does not imply certain employment even after the second type of
programme. Besides, correlation between Z¯D and X¯0 is higher than correlation
between Z¯D and X¯1 (except for the 6 month version, which is equal) : this can
be seen again as a proof of the ”wrong” selection process.
Correlations in the observables induce very similar correlations in the ﬁtted
probabilities:
Corr6 months(Pr(Y1 = 1jX);Pr(Y0 = 1jX)) = 0:823
Corr6 months(Pr(D = 1jZ);Pr(Y0 = 1jX)) = 0:399
Corr6 months(Pr(D = 1jZ);Pr(Y1 = 1jX)) = 0:424
5While it is straightforward to determine the eﬀect of X¯0 and X¯1 on 4, it is hard to
settle the inﬂuence of Z¯D on it. The most obvious way would be to estimate the model non-
parametrically, determining the relationship between objects like 4ATE and 4ATT on Z¯D.6.4 Selection on observables and unobservables 69
Corr12 months(Pr(Y1 = 1jX);Pr(Y0 = 1jX)) = 0:798
Corr12 months(Pr(D = 1jZ);Pr(Y0 = 1jX)) = 0:49
Corr12 months(Pr(D = 1jZ);Pr(Y1 = 1jX)) = 0:251
Corr24 months(Pr(Y1 = 1jX);Pr(Y0 = 1jX)) = 0:781
Corr24 months(Pr(D = 1jZ);Pr(Y0 = 1jX)) = 0:307
Corr24 months(Pr(D = 1jZ);Pr(Y1 = 1jX)) = 0:244
This analysis on the correlations between diﬀerent parameters is consistent with
the evidence from the mean treatment eﬀects: parameters without unobservables
selection allowance are much diﬀerent from those selection-corrected and they are
misleading. Correlations, probabilities and impacts based only on observable char-
acteristics are too optimistic, while those based on unobservables are reporting
worse and sometimes negative eﬀects from participating in private sector pro-
grammes. In particular, individuals most likely to enter a PRP are those most
likely to be employed anyway and least likely to beneﬁt from participating. This
is true for both observed and unobserved characteristics:
Corr6 months(UD;U1 ¡ U0) = ¡0:234
Corr6 months(Z¯D;X(¯1 ¡ ¯0)) = ¡0:182
Corr12 months(UD;U1 ¡ U0) = ¡0:478
Corr12 months(Z¯D;X(¯1 ¡ ¯0)) = ¡0:524
Corr24 months(UD;U1 ¡ U0) = ¡0:264
Corr24 months(Z¯D;X(¯1 ¡ ¯0)) = ¡0:125
So I found that characteristics associated with better labour market outcomes
are negatively correlated with training eﬀects, i.e. individuals with characteris-
tics which make them more likely to get a job after programme participation are
those with worse treatment eﬀects. To improve the overall eﬀectiveness of these
programmes a change in the allocation process made by caseworkers is required:
selecting for each type of programme those individuals more likely to gain from
participating in such a programme.70 Results
6.5 Sensitivity analyses
In the model presented in this study I introduce an additional instrumental vari-
able, namely the rate of use of private sector programmes relative to the country-
wide rate, in the equation that accounts for selection into programmes. Given the
normal factor structure used to model the unobservables, it was not required to
add this variable; as explained in Chapter 4, I decided to append the instrument to
improve the identiﬁcation of the model. I have also estimated the model without
the additional instrument to show the diﬀerence in the estimates (Tables J.1-J.3
to L.1-L.3). Results are basically the same, with diﬀerences on the estimates at
the third decimal point; however, in the version without the additional instru-
ment there is an increase in the estimates’ standard errors. This conﬁrms that the
instrument improves the identiﬁcation of the model.
A second crucial issue related to the instrumental variable is whether this
variable is a valid instrument or not. To be a valid instrument for the selection
equation, it has to correlate with the selection outcome variable but not directly
with the two employment outcomes. The ﬁrst requirement is satisﬁed: the co-
eﬃcient of the instrument in the model is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, with
a p-value smaller than 0.01. To check if also the second requirement is satisﬁed
I run a version of the model with the instrument as a regressor even in the two
employment equations (Tables G.1-G.3 to I.1-I.3): if its coeﬃcient estimate is sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, than it is possible to infer that the instrument has
no direct eﬀect on the employment outcomes. Only in the 12 months speciﬁcation
the instrument does not aﬀect the two employment outcomes, while for the 6 and
24 month versions there seem to be some problems: in the 6 month time horizon I
reject the null hypothesis of a zero parameter for the relative use of PRPs variable
in the public programme employment equation, while in the 24 months I reject it
for the private programme employment equation.
Finally, the last assumption taken in this study is the common factor’s normal-
ity. To test whether this hypothesis inﬂuences my results, I estimate the model
with another assumption for the common factor, namely that it follows a dis-
crete distribution with a ﬁxed number of points of support (this is the so called6.5 Sensitivity analyses 71
Heckman-Singer procedure). I use three points of support since the improvement
in the likelihood failed to be signiﬁcant any more6. All results are reported in
Tables M.1-M.7 to O.1-O.7. Coeﬃcient estimates are very similar to the ones ob-
tained from the model with the assumption of a normal distributed factor, but
mean and distributional parameter estimates are slightly diﬀerent: they are qual-
itatively similar but vary considerably in size.
6See Section 4.3.1 for details.Chapter 7
Conclusions
Some words of caution are in order, about these conclusions. First, I focused my
attention on the employment eﬀects only of the programmes. This is because the
main purpose of these programmes is to facilitate unemployed workers return to
work. Even though there might be some additional possibly interesting eﬀects
(e.g., occupational choice, subsequent earnings, etc.), which are beyond the scope
of this study.
Second, all the results presented here are employment eﬀects of private sector
programmes relative to public sector programmes. In some senses, this type of
diﬀerential treatment eﬀect analysis should be done as a second stage analyses, in
order to choose the most eﬀective programme for any given category of individuals,
after a ﬁrst stage analyses has ascertained ﬁnding out if a programme has a positive
treatment eﬀect if compared with no participation.
Third, it should be kept in mind that the results depend on the assumptions
made, speciﬁcation and distributional assumptions. The simple one factor assump-
tion could be relaxed, and a more ﬂexible structure may lead to diﬀerent results.
The normality assumption for the common factor allows simple manipulation and
calculation of the probabilities induced by the model, but it is clearly restrictive.
It is worth noting, however, that a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the unobserved
component, by means of the Heckman and Singer (1984) procedure, showed that
results are robust with respect to the distributional assumption.
Programmes involving unemployed workers in private ﬁrm’s have always been74 Conclusions
considered the most successful in helping unemployed individuals to go back to
work. In this dissertation, I take a new look on the employment eﬀects of private
sector programmes: I do this by comparing individuals who participated in a PRP
with individuals participating in a PUP. The reason for looking at these diﬀerential
eﬀects is twofold: in Denmark there is no unemployed individual who does not
participate in any Employment Enhancement Programme (otherwise stated, there
is not a control group of non-treated individuals); given that, the interest is in
determining whether public sector programmes can be as eﬃcient as the private
sector programmes in helping unemployed individuals to go back to employment.
The model used is a discrete outcomes model within a latent variable frame-
work, with one equation selecting individuals into PRPs or PUPs, two employment
equations - one for each type of programme individuals participate in - and a nor-
mal factor structure for errors. This framework enables the treatment eﬀect to vary
among observationally identical people, thus allowing for heterogeneous treatment
eﬀects and distributional parameters on diﬀerent sub-populations.
The raw data suggest a large employment eﬀect of private sector programmes
and a smaller success for public sector programmes. Besides, the probability
of being employed for PRPs participants (slightly) decreases with time, while it
(slightly) increases for PUPs participants.
Results from the model based analyses can be summarized in three points.
If I take into account the selection on observable characteristics only, the results
do not change that much: PRP programmes still have a higher employment eﬀect,
but smaller in size, and the negative trend persists. When considering also the
selection on unobservables, the story is completely diﬀerent: mean parameters fail
to be statistically signiﬁcant (values are negative or close to zero) and the trend
becomes positive, as if PRPs were more helpful in bringing people back to work as
time passes. While a randomly selected individual would gain (on average) from
participating in a PRP instead of a PUP programme in each of the time horizons,
an actual PRP participant will beneﬁt from it (on average) only 2 years after the
end of the programme.
A second main result is the variability of the treatment eﬀect. Thanks to the
model structure, it is possible to see to what extent the relative impact of the PRPs75
varies among individuals: the empirical variance of the mean treatment eﬀects is
fairly big, 4ATE and 4ATT are much diﬀerent from each other, the former being
larger than the latter, and the distributional parameters show that the majority
of the participants are not aﬀected by the programme they are exposed to (if they
were employed/unemployed after a PRP they would be employed/unemployed
after a PUP as well, respectively), while some individuals are hurt and others
beneﬁt from participation.
A third result is about the characteristics that make people more or less likely
to beneﬁt from a programme. The MTE distributional parameters clarify the
perverse selection process, according to which individuals most likely to participate
in a PRP programme are those who are likely to beneﬁt less from it, or even
to be penalized from it (this conclusion is in accordance with ATE and ATT
parameters).
These results summarized above suggest that there is room for improvement
in the allocation process made by caseworkers: if individuals beneﬁting the most
from a private sector programme were allocated to it, there would be an overall
improvement in the treatment eﬀect. This conclusion is based on the model where
selection on the unobservables is allowed; so, if the allocation to diﬀerent types of
programmes was based not only on observable characteristics but on unobservables
as well, there would be better results. Obviously, caseworkers need to know this
and, for example, they might try to gain it directly from individuals during an
interview or by basing their decisions on previous evaluations.Appendix A
Formulas
I report here the formulas implied by the model speciﬁed in Chapter 4. The for-
mulas have a relatively straightforward expression implied by all the assumptions
made throughout the dissertation:
² an equation with discrete outcome selecting individuals into private sector
(D = 1) or public sector programmes (D = 0);
² two equations with discrete outcomes determining employment state for
PRPs (Y1) and PUPs (Y0) participants, respectively;
² (Y1i;Y0i) are deﬁned 8i;
² there is no interaction among agents;
² Z¯D is a nondegenerate random variable conditional on X = x;
² (UD,U1) and (UD,U0) are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure on R2;
² (UD,U1) and (UD,U0) are independent of (Z,X);
² Y1 and Y0 have ﬁnite ﬁrst moments;
² 0<Pr[D =1jX ]<1;78 Formulas
² a one factor structure for the three equations errors, with (µ;²D;²1;²0)T »
N(0;I), where I is the identity matrix, observations are supposed to be i.i.d.
and ®D is set to 1.
ATE formulas
For the individuals with observed characteristics x these are the ATE formulas,
























[(1 ¡ Φ(x¯1 + ®1µ))(1 ¡ Φ(x¯0 + ®0µ))]Á(µ)dµ
Deﬁne Pr
ATE
4 (j;x) ´ E[4 = jjX = x]:
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4 (¡1;x) = Pr
ATE
Y1;Y0(0;1;x)
It is now possible to write the diﬀerential average treatment eﬀect:
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Below are reported the expressions of the probabilities characterizing the joint
distribution of the selection and outcomes equations for individuals with observed
characteristics x and z.
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[(1 ¡ Φ(x¯1 + ®1µ))(1 ¡ Φ(x¯0 + ®0µ))] ¢ :::
::: ¢ Φ(z¯D + µ)Á(µ)dµ
Deﬁne Pr
ATT
4 (j;x;z) ´ E[4 = jjX = x;Z = z;D = 1]:
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4 (¡1;x;z) = Pr
ATT
Y1;Y0(0;1;x;z)
From the expressions above we can now derive the diﬀerential average treat-
ment eﬀect on the treated:
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Finally, these are the formulas when I take into consideration if individuals have
unobserved characteristics more or less likely to make them selected into private
or public programmes, i.e. UD = u.
Deﬁne Pr
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[(1 ¡ Φ(x¯1 + ®1µ))(1 ¡ Φ(x¯0 + ®0µ))] ¢ :::
::: ¢ Á(u + µ)Á(µ)dµ
Deﬁne Pr
MTE
4 (j;x;u) ´ E[4 = jjX = x;UD = u]:
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4 (¡1;x;u) = Pr
MTE
Y1;Y0(0;1;x;u)81
Using the probabilities above, it is now straightforward to calculate the marginal
diﬀerential treatment eﬀect:
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The estimation of the model presented in Chapter 5 involves numerical integration.
I decided to use a Gaussian approach basically because its aim is to ﬁnd points
and weights as to make the approximation of the integral of interest a ”good” one.
In order to accomplish this, we need to deﬁne a ”good” criterion for the quadra-
ture. The criterion used in Gaussian formulas is exact integration for a ﬁnite-
dimensional collection of functions. More speciﬁcally, weights and nodes have to
be chosen so that the approximation is exactly correct when the integrand is a
low-order polynomial. The remarkable feature of Gaussian quadrature is that it
accomplishes this for spaces of degree 2n ¡ 1 polynomials using only n nodes and
n weights.
In this paper I use in particular a Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule. To evaluate
the general form
R 1
















for some » 2 (¡1;1). It is possible to ﬁnd nodes and weights for diﬀerent values
on n reported in tables or using online calculators such as www.efunda.com.
Gauss-Hermite quadrature will be used in connection with Normal random
variables. If Y is distributed N(¹;¾2), then







dy :84 Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule
However, it is to remark that to use Gauss-Hermite quadrature to compute such
expectations, it is necessary to use a linear change of variables, x = (y ¡ ¹)=¾
p
2,















Hence the general Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule for expectations of functions of
a normal random variable is















where the wi and xi are the Gauss-Hermite quadrature weights and nodes over
[¡1;1]1.
In the model used here the Normal random variable is the common factor

















where Li is the likelihood function known except for a ﬁnite number of parameters
(¯D;¯1;¯0;®1;®0).
As seen above, I need a change of variable and I use the linear change x = (1=
p
2)µ



































where K is the number of evaluation points used for the approximation and wk
is the weight associated with the evaluation point xk (k = 1;:::;K). When K
increases the accuracy of the approximation in (B.3) is improved.
In this paper I use 5 evaluation points:
xk wk
k = 1 -2.02018287046 0.019953242059
k = 2 -0.958572464614 0.393619323152
k = 3 0 0.945308720483
k = 4 0.958572464614 0.393619323152
k = 5 2.02018287046 0.019953242059
I stopped at 5 points because the accuracy that 2 or more further points guaranteed
was not signiﬁcant.Appendix C
Descriptive statistics
Below some descriptive statistics are reported, for private (PRP) and public (PUP)
programmes participants, respectively.
PRP participants PUP participants




6 months after end of programme 54.64% 34.29%
12 months after end of programme 53.2% 37.3%





Cohabitating 16.68% 11.67%88 Descriptive statistics
PRP participants PUP participants















Primary or lower secondary school 57.87% 58.65%
Upper secondary school 20.92% 24.92%
Vocational education 19.12% 12.78%
Further or higher education 2.08% 3.65%
Work experience:
0-2 years 51.19% 64.44%
2-5 years 20.7% 13.73%
5-10 years 15.74% 11.67%
10+ years 12.37% 10.16%89
PRP participants PUP participants
Time spent in diﬀerent states dur-




Ordinary education 15.51% 18.29%
Time spent in diﬀerent states dur-
ing a 2 years period starting 3




Ordinary education 9.25% 11.28%
No available information: 28.03% 33.17%
Municipalities





Regional unemployment rate rela-
tive to countrywide rate
101.28% 103.87%
Proportion of programme partici-
pants in PRPs relative to country-
wide importance of PRPs
122.17% 107.88%Appendix D
Parameter estimates
This appendix reports the parameter estimates of the three equations of the model:
the ﬁrst determining the selection into private or public programmes, while the
second and the third are the employment state equations for the private sector and
the public sector participants, respectively, for the various model speciﬁcations.
Results were obtained using Gauss 41.
The organization of the tables is as follows. Each table is characterized by a
letter and a number, the former being the model speciﬁcation, while the latter
represents which parameters are reported. See the two tables on the next page for
a quick reference. Model speciﬁcations A to F are the core model used to evaluate
the diﬀerential treatment eﬀect of private sector programmes relative to public
sector programmes. I report for each time horizon both cases - with and without
selection on unobservable characteristics - to show the diﬀerence implied by taking
into consideration also the selection on unobservables process with respect to the
case when there is only selection on observable characteristics. I then decided to
concentrate my attention in the model with selection on the unobservables since it
is the most satisfactory model and it allows a more ﬂexible structure of the error
terms across equations. Tables G.1-G.3 to I.1-I.3 are the results of the speciﬁcation
used to test if the further instrument introduced in the ﬁrst equation of the model is
1In the tables, “Coeﬀ.”, “Std.”, “Sgl.” and “Marg.” mean “Coeﬃcient”, “Standard error”,
“Signiﬁcance level” and “Marginal eﬀect [of the regressor on the outcome]”, respectively, while
one, two or three asterisks mean a 10, 5 or 1 per cent level of signiﬁcance, respectively.92 Parameter estimates
Letter Speciﬁcation
A Model without selection on the unobservables, 6 months
B Model with selection on the unobservables, 6 months
C Model without selection on the unobservables, 12 months
D Model with selection on the unobservables, 12 months
E Model without selection on the unobservables, 24 months
F Model with selection on the unobservables, 24 months
G Test further instrument, 6 months
H Test further instrument, 12 months
I Test further instrument, 24 months
J Model without the additional instrument, 6 months
K Model without the additional instrument, 12 months
L Model without the additional instrument, 24 months
M Heckman-Singer procedure, 6 months
N Heckman-Singer procedure, 12 months
O Heckman-Singer procedure, 24 months
Number Parameters estimated
1 Selection equation
2 employment state for PRP participants
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valid or not. Tables J.1-J.3 to L.1-L.3 report the model without the additional in-
strument, so testing if it improve the empirical identiﬁcation of the model. Finally,
tables M.1-M.7 to O.1-O.7 include the results of the estimation I run to test the
common factor’s normality hypothesis, the so called Singer-Heckman procedure.93
Table A.1
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state 6
months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters determining
selection into PRP programmes.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .798 .354 ** .201
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .106 .146 .027
30-39 -.075 .156 -.019
40-49 -.254 .191 -.064
50-66 -.146 .264 -.037
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .343 .201 * .087
Cohabitating .334 .124 *** .084
Has children .107 .16 .027
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.128 .111 -.032
Vocational education .169 .116 .043
Further or higher education -.514 .222 ** -.13
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .597 .125 *** .151
5-10 years .471 .159 *** .119
10+ years .458 .19 *** .11694 Parameter estimates
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .14 .149 .035
Ordinary education .16 .161 .04
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.63 .17 *** -.159
Ordinary education -.372 .209 * -.094
No available information -.259 .142 * -.065
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .803 .13 *** .203
1995 -.311 .099 *** -.078
1996 -.762 .117 *** -.192
1997 -.715 .133 *** -.181
1998 -.902 .157 *** -.228
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.048 .114 -.012
40,000-100,000 .072 .102 .018
>100,000 -.081 .103 -.02
Relative unemployment level -.839 .304 *** -.212
Relative importance of PRP programmes .307 .06 *** .077
Common unobserved factor 1.00095
Table A.2
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), participants in PRP
programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment state 6
months after the end of the programme period.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .83 .361 ** .304
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .123 .133 .045
30-39 -.228 .15 -.083
40-49 -.591 .184 *** -.216
50-66 -.336 .253 -.123
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .02 .181 .007
Cohabitating -.015 .115 -.005
Has children .06 .148 .022
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .297 .11 *** .109
Vocational education .262 .105 ** .096
Further or higher education .172 .255 .063
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .284 .115 ** .104
5-10 years .407 .154 *** .149
10+ years .558 .178 *** .20496 Parameter estimates
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.465 .142 *** -.17
Ordinary education -.371 .156 ** -.136
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.593 .154 *** -.217
Ordinary education -.239 .203 -.087
No available information .069 .134 .025
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .089 .098 .032
1995 .035 .099 .013
1996 -.099 .126 -.036
1997 -.289 .146 ** -.106
1998 -.074 .202 -.027
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .203 .108 * .074
40,000-100,000 .041 .098 .015
>100,000 .134 .102 .049
Relative unemployment level -.53 .327 -.19497
Table A.3
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), participants in PRP
programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment state 6
months after the end of the programme period.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .801 .334 ** .268
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 -.243 .159 -.081
30-39 -.552 .173 *** -.185
40-49 -.971 .232 *** -.325
50-66 -.834 .304 *** -.279
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.15 .247 -.05
Cohabitating .081 .144 .027
Has children .429 .193 ** .143
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .243 .111 ** .081
Vocational education .134 .139 .045
Further or higher education .365 .231 .122
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .351 .139 ** .117
5-10 years .368 .181 ** .123
10+ years .835 .217 *** .27998 Parameter estimates
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.573 .162 *** -.192
Ordinary education .033 .156 .011
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.537 .193 *** -.18
Ordinary education -.169 .217 -.057
No available information -.166 .151 -.056
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 -.142 .178 -.047
1995 .037 .113 .012
1996 .031 .115 .011
1997 .058 .138 .019
1998 -.036 .146 -.012
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.047 .121 -.016
40,000-100,000 -.082 .112 -.027
>100,000 -.237 .107 ** -.079
Relative unemployment level -.703 .276 ** -.23599
Table A.4
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state
6 months after the end of the programme, average treatment eﬀect 4ATE and












.319 .149 .207 .325 .532 .171
(.013) (.008) (.01) (.011) (.007) (.02)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Table A.5
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state 6
months after the end of the programme, average treatment eﬀect on the treated













.325 .147 .221 .308 .528 .179
(.014) (.009) (.012) (.011) (.008) (.022)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Table A.6
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state
6 months after the end of the programme, marginal treatment eﬀect 4MTE and












.321 .149 .208 .322 .53 .171
(.013) (.008) (.01) (.011) (.007) (.02)
*** *** *** *** *** ***100 Parameter estimates
Table A.7
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state 6
months after the end of the programme, marginal eﬀect of explanatory variables












Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .057 .056
Cohabitating -.032 -.034
Has children -.121 -.124
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school .028 .027
Vocational education .051 .049
Further or higher education -.059 -.058
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years -.013 -.018
5-10 years .026 .021






State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .022 .024
Ordinary education -.147 -.147
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.037 -.031
Ordinary education -.031 -.028
No available information .081 .083










Relative unemployment level .041 .049102 Parameter estimates
Table B.1
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), employ-
ment state 6 months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters
determining selection into PRP programmes.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .81 .353 ** .204
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .112 .146 .028
30-39 -.066 .156 -.017
40-49 -.245 .192 -.062
50-66 -.12 .265 -.03
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .336 .201 * .085
Cohabitating .33 .124 *** .083
Has children .106 .16 .027
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.132 .111 -.033
Vocational education .166 .116 .042
Further or higher education -.518 .223 ** -.131
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .591 .125 *** .149
5-10 years .463 .159 *** .117
10+ years .449 .19 ** .113103
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .134 .149 .034
Ordinary education .16 .161 .04
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.629 .17 *** -.159
Ordinary education .-37 .209 * -.093
No available information -.263 .142 * -.066
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .799 .13 *** .202
1995 -.31 .099 *** -.078
1996 -.766 .117 *** -.193
1997 -.714 .133 *** -.18
1998 -.902 .157 *** -.228
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.057 .114 -.014
40,000-100,000 .069 .103 .017
>100,000 -.082 .103 -.021
Relative unemployment level -.851 .303 *** -.215
Relative importance of PRP programmes .315 .06 *** .08
Common unobserved factor 1.000104 Parameter estimates
Table B.2
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), participants
in PRP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 6 months after the end of the programme period.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .792 .377 ** .286
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .131 .137 .047
30-39 -.23 .152 -.083
40-49 -.6 .193 *** -.217
50-66 -.337 .255 -.122
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .034 .19 .012
Cohabitating -.002 .126 -.001
Has children .062 .15 .022
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .295 .111 *** .107
Vocational education .271 .114 ** .098
Further or higher education .146 .268 .053
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .313 .16 * .113
5-10 years .428 .18 ** .155
10+ years .581 .205 *** .21105
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.462 .143 *** -.167
Ordinary education -.364 .158 ** -.132
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.622 .201 *** -.225
Ordinary education -.253 .215 -.091
No available information .061 .139 .022
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .119 .152 .043
1995 .022 .111 .008
1996 -.133 .187 -.048
1997 -.324 .198 -.117
1998 -.12 .271 -.043
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .204 .109 * .074
40,000-100,000 .047 .101 .017
>100,000 .127 .105 .046
Relative unemployment level -.562 .37 -.203
Common unobserved factor .146 .568106 Parameter estimates
Table B.3
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), participants
in PUP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 6 months after the end of the programme period.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 1.452 1.19 .432
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 -.239 .191 -.071
30-39 -.622 .291 ** -.185
40-49 -1.129 .488 ** -.336
50-66 -.934 .489 * -.278
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.11 .288 -.033
Cohabitating .158 .208 .047
Has children .516 .291 * .154
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .249 .138 * .074
Vocational education .184 .193 .055
Further or higher education .321 .265 .096
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .52 .346 .155
5-10 years .517 .35 .154
10+ years 1.028 .492 ** .306107
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.628 .243 *** -.187
Ordinary education .082 .198 .024
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.75 .461 -.223
Ordinary education -.26 .31 -.077
No available information -.239 .227 -.071
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .045 .331 .013
1995 -.025 .151 -.007
1996 -.111 .231 -.033
1997 -.077 .235 -.023
1998 -.218 .308 -.065
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.053 .141 -.016
40,000-100,000 -.053 .131 -.016
>100,000 -.284 .164 * -.084
Relative unemployment level -.932 .596 -.278
Common unobserved factor .643 .939108 Parameter estimates
Table B.4
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment
state 6 months after the end of the programme, average treatment eﬀect 4ATE and












.226 .205 .271 .298 .569 .021
(.126) (.055) (.08) (.112) (.09) (.172)
* *** *** *** ***
Table B.5
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment
state 6 months after the end of the programme, average treatment eﬀect on the













.191 .24 .355 .214 .57 -.049
(.145) (.112) (.145) (.112) (.066) (.25)
** ** * ***109
Tables B.6
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), parameters
regarding the employment state 6 months after the end of the programme, marginal
treatment eﬀect 4MTE and associated distributional parameters regarding the












.149 .275 .404 .171 .576 -.126
(.19) (.178) (.208) (.155) (.084) (.358)
* ***












.232 .209 .268 .291 .56 .023
(.114) (.066) (.088) (.099) (.054) (.178)
** *** *** *** ***












.297 .13 .149 .424 .573 .166
(.249) (.09) (.079) (.252) (.177) (.329)
* * ***
c. Values when UD = 2.110 Parameter estimates
Table B.7
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), employment
state 6 months after the end of the programme, marginal eﬀect of explanatory












Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .045 .058
Cohabitating -.048 -.036
Has children -.131 -.129
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school .032 .026
Vocational education .043 .049
Further or higher education -.043 -.063
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years -.042 -.022
5-10 years .001 .016






State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .02 .028
Ordinary education -.156 -.15
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.001 -.021
Ordinary education -.014 -.027
No available information .093 .084










Relative unemployment level .074 .047
Relative importance of PRP programmes .012112 Parameter estimates
Table C.1
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state 12
months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters determining
selection into PRP programmes.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .797 .354 ** .201
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .106 .146 .027
30-39 -.075 .157 -.019
40-49 -.254 .193 -.064
50-66 -.146 .263 -.037
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .344 .2 * .087
Cohabitating .334 .125 *** .084
Has children .107 .16 .027
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.128 .111 -.032
Vocational education .169 .116 .043
Further or higher education -.514 .222 ** -.13
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .597 .125 *** .151
5-10 years .471 .159 *** .119
10+ years .458 .19 ** .116113
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .14 .149 .035
Ordinary education .16 .161 .04
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.63 .169 *** -.159
Ordinary education -.372 .209 * -.094
No available information -.259 .142 * -.065
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .803 .13 *** .203
1995 -.311 .099 *** -.078
1996 -.762 .117 *** -.192
1997 -.715 .133 *** -.181
1998 -.902 .157 *** -.228
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.048 .115 -.012
40,000-100,000 .072 .103 .018
>100,000 -.081 .103 -.02
Relative unemployment level -.838 .304 *** -.212
Relative importance of PRP programmes .307 .06 *** .077
Common unobserved factor 1.000114 Parameter estimates
Table C.2
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), participants in PRP
programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment state 12
months after the end of the programme period.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 1.271 .367 *** .472
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .035 .134 .013
30-39 -.267 .147 * -.099
40-49 -.73 .184 *** -.271
50-66 -.713 .25 *** -.265
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .041 .181 .015
Cohabitating .028 .113 .01
Has children .124 .147 .046
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .031 .109 .011
Vocational education .258 .104 ** .096
Further or higher education .382 .267 .142
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .2 .115 * .074
5-10 years .426 .154 *** .158
10+ years .569 .179 *** .211115
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.319 .142 ** -.119
Ordinary education -.259 .154 * -.096
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.505 .152 *** -.188
Ordinary education -.111 .203 -.041
No available information .063 .133 .023
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .192 .097 ** .071
1995 .056 .098 .021
1996 .013 .125 .005
1997 -.141 .141 -.052
1998 -.019 .196 -.007
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .01 .106 .004
40,000-100,000 -.042 .098 -.016
>100,000 .137 .103 .051
Relative unemployment level -1.025 .331 *** -.381116 Parameter estimates
Table C.3
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), participants in PRP
programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment state 24
months after the end of the programme period.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .377 .345 .134
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .064 .153 .023
30-39 -.387 .167 ** -.137
40-49 -.705 .219 *** -.25
50-66 -.848 .286 *** -.3
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .115 .237 .041
Cohabitating .038 .138 .013
Has children .13 .19 .046
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .144 .108 .051
Vocational education .418 .136 *** .148
Further or higher education .307 .212 .109
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .185 .137 .066
5-10 years .171 .17 .06
10+ years .169 .211 .06117
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.426 .158 *** -.151
Ordinary education -.134 .155 -.047
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.398 .185 ** -.141
Ordinary education -.15 .21 -.053
No available information .012 .149 .004
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 -.16 .169 -.057
1995 -.12 .108 -.042
1996 -.039 .113 -.014
1997 .008 .137 .003
1998 -.312 .151 ** -.11
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .134 .117 .048
40,000-100,000 -.057 .11 -.02
>100,000 -.058 .107 -.02
Relative unemployment level -.31 .3 -.11118 Parameter estimates
Table C.4
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state
12 months after the end of the programme, average treatment eﬀect 4ATE and












.299 .172 .213 .317 .53 .127
(.012) (.009) (.01) (.011) (.006) (.02)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Table C.5
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state 12
months after the end of the programme, average treatment eﬀect on the treated













.305 .168 .227 .3 .526 .137
(.014) (.009) (.012) (.011) (.007) (.022)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Table C.6
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state
12 months after the end of the programme, marginal treatment eﬀect 4MTE and












.3 .173 .214 .313 .527 .127
(.012) (.009) (.01) (.011) (.006) (.02)
*** *** *** *** *** ***119
Table C.7
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state 12
months after the end of the programme, marginal eﬀect of explanatory variables












Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.026 -.028
Cohabitating -.003 -.005
Has children -.0001 -.001
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.04 -.039
Vocational education -.052 -.054
Further or higher education .033 .035
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .009 .004
5-10 years .098 .094






State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .032 .033
Ordinary education -.049 -.049
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.047 -.041
Ordinary education .012 .015
No available information .019 .021










Relative unemployment level -.271 -.264121
Table D.1
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters
determining selection into PRP programmes.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .847 .355 ** .214
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .107 .147 .027
30-39 -.052 .157 -.013
40-49 -.23 .193 -.058
50-66 -.102 .266 -.026
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .33 .201 * .083
Cohabitating .329 .125 *** .083
Has children .117 .16 .03
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.126 .111 -.032
Vocational education .165 .116 .042
Further or higher education -.516 .223 ** -.13
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .592 .125 *** .149
5-10 years .463 .159 *** .117
10+ years .428 .19 ** .108122 Parameter estimates
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .128 .15 .032
Ordinary education .164 .16 .041
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.633 .169 *** -.16
Ordinary education -.392 .209 * -.099
No available information -.268 .142 * -.068
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .798 .13 *** .201
1995 -.313 .1 *** -.079
1996 -.772 .116 *** -.195
1997 -.713 .133 *** -.18
1998 -.908 .157 *** -.229
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.049 .115 -.012
40,000-100,000 .065 .103 .016
>100,000 -.073 .103 -.019
Relative unemployment level -.882 .305 *** -.223
Relative importance of PRP programmes .314 .06 *** .079
Common unobserved factor 1.000123
Table D.2
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), participants
in PRP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme period.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 1.446 .56 *** .484
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .024 .145 .008
30-39 -.28 .165 * -.094
40-49 -.752 .23 *** -.252
50-66 -.753 .301 ** -.252
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .004 .201 .001
Cohabitating -.009 .134 -.003
Has children .121 .158 .04
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .045 .12 .015
Vocational education .252 .114 ** .084
Further or higher education .468 .342 .157
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .142 .142 .048
5-10 years .402 .167 ** .135
10+ years .549 .196 *** .184124 Parameter estimates
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.355 .177 ** -.119
Ordinary education -.301 .189 -.101
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.47 .165 *** -.157
Ordinary education -.076 .223 -.026
No available information .093 .153 .031
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .125 .133 .042
1995 .1 .126 .034
1996 .117 .207 .039
1997 -.05 .192 -.017
1998 .117 .29 .039
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .015 .115 .005
40,000-100,000 -.058 .11 -.019
>100,000 .168 .125 .056
Relative unemployment level -.977 .353 *** -.327
Common unobserved factor -.436 .661125
Table D.3
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), participants
in PUP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme period.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 1.21 1.23 .334
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .124 .207 .034
30-39 -.47 .291 -.129
40-49 -.91 .499 * -.251
50-66 -1.037 .573 * -.286
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .214 .338 .059
Cohabitating .133 .223 .037
Has children .209 .259 .058
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .144 .14 .04
Vocational education .554 .326 * .153
Further or higher education .261 .265 .072
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .394 .357 .108
5-10 years .341 .339 .094
10+ years .319 .349 .088126 Parameter estimates
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.494 .26 * -.136
Ordinary education -.11 .195 -.03
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.671 .498 -.185
Ordinary education -.278 .342 -.077
No available information -.049 .205 -.013
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .082 .364 .023
1995 -.237 .218 -.065
1996 -.243 .298 -.067
1997 -.182 .287 -.05
1998 -.617 .49 -.17
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .167 .162 .046
40,000-100,000 -.015 .143 -.004
>100,000 -.087 .143 -.024
Relative unemployment level -.591 .589 -.163
Common unobserved factor .861 1.08127
Table D.4
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employ-
ment state 12 months after the end of the programme, average treatment eﬀect













.293 .236 .299 .173 .471 .057
(.101) (.07) (.044) (.117) (.09) (.149)
*** *** *** ***
Table D.5
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme, average treatment eﬀect on the













.177 .326 .355 .143 .498 -.149
(.103) (.119) (.103) (.119) (.068) (.212)
* *** *** ***128 Parameter estimates
Tables D.6
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), parame-
ters regarding the employment state 12 months after the end of the programme,
marginal treatment eﬀect 4MTE and associated distributional parameters regard-












.098 .441 .341 .12 .461 -.344
(.103) (.199) (.147) (.165) (.127) (.291)
** ** ***












.273 .217 .326 .185 .51 .056
(.104) (.073) (.082) (.102) (.041) (.176)
*** *** *** * ***












.536 .076 .205 .183 .388 .46
(.24) (.056) (.101) (.221) (.185) (.295)
** ** **
c. Values when UD = 2.129
Table D.7
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme, marginal eﬀect of explanatory












Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.058 -.021
Cohabitating -.04 -.004
Has children -.017 -.001
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.024 -.036
Vocational education -.068 -.042
Further or higher education .085 .039
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years -.061 .007
5-10 years .041 .097






State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .017 .022
Ordinary education -.07 -.058
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment .028 -.051
Ordinary education .051 .006
No available information .044 .017










Relative unemployment level -.165 -.275
Relative importance of PRP programmes .033131
Table E.1
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state 24
months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters determining
selection into PRP programmes.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .801 .354 ** .202
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .106 .147 .027
30-39 -.074 .157 -.019
40-49 -.253 .192 -.064
50-66 -.143 .265 -.036
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .34 .201 * .086
Cohabitating .333 .125 *** .084
Has children .109 .16 .027
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.127 .111 -.032
Vocational education .169 .117 .043
Further or higher education -.508 .223 ** -.128
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .597 .126 *** .151
5-10 years .471 .159 *** .119
10+ years .456 .191 ** .115132 Parameter estimates
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .139 .149 .035
Ordinary education .16 .161 .04
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.628 .169 *** -.159
Ordinary education -.372 .209 * -.094
No available information -.257 .142 * -.065
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .801 .129 *** .202
1995 -.311 .099 *** -.079
1996 -.764 .117 *** -.193
1997 -.72 .133 *** -.182
1998 -.902 .157 *** -.228
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.049 .115 -.012
40,000-100,000 .073 .102 .018
>100,000 -.081 .103 -.02
Relative unemployment level -.841 .304 *** -.212
Relative importance of PRP programmes .306 .06 *** .077
Common unobserved factor 1.000133
Table E.2
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), participants in PRP
programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment state 24
months after the end of the programme period.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .289 .359 .107
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .121 .133 .045
30-39 -.281 .143 ** -.104
40-49 -.571 .186 *** -.212
50-66 -.539 .256 ** -.2
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .02 .185 .007
Cohabitating -.002 .114 -.001
Has children .3 .15 ** .111
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school -.197 .11 * -.073
Vocational education .163 .105 .06
Further or higher education .469 .286 .174
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .258 .113 ** .096
5-10 years .516 .149 *** .191
10+ years .484 .18 *** .179134 Parameter estimates
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.31 .143 ** -.115
Ordinary education -.381 .157 ** -.141
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.767 .157 *** -.284
Ordinary education -.177 .206 -.066
No available information -.204 .137 -.076
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .066 .098 .024
1995 .072 .099 .027
1996 .109 .128 .04
1997 -.08 .143 -.03
1998 .02 .179 .008
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .258 .11 ** .095
40,000-100,000 .076 .099 .028
>100,000 .121 .102 .045
Relative unemployment level .002 .322 .001135
Table E.3
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), participants in PRP
programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment state 24
months after the end of the programme period.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .004 .353 .001
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 -.19 .16 -.067
30-39 -.684 .172 *** -.24
40-49 -1.004 .207 *** -.353
50-66 -1.263 288 *** -.444
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .247 .23 .087
Cohabitating -.04 .137 -.014
Has children .265 .179 .093
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school -.012 .109 -.004
Vocational education .176 .137 .062
Further or higher education .269 .223 .094
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .528 .141 *** .185
5-10 years .46 .171 *** .162
10+ years .807 .197 *** .283136 Parameter estimates
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.193 .157 -.068
Ordinary education -.241 .16 -.085
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.469 .186 ** -.165
Ordinary education .075 .213 .026
No available information -.009 .152 -.003
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 -.19 .178 -.067
1995 .138 .109 .049
1996 .248 .115 ** .087
1997 .213 .13 .075
1998 -.166 .152 -.058
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .283 .118 ** .1
40,000-100,000 .167 .111 .059
>100,000 .008 .108 .003
Relative unemployment level -.253 .305 -.089137
Table E.4
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state
24 months after the end of the programme, average treatment eﬀect 4ATE and












.29 .175 .201 .334 .535 .115
(.012) (.009) (.01) (.012) (.006) (.02)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Table E.5
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state 24
months after the end of the programme, average treatment eﬀect on the treated













.296 .172 .214 .319 .532 .124
(.013) (.01) (.012) (.011) (.007) (.022)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Table E.6
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state
24 months after the end of the programme, marginal treatment eﬀect 4MTE and












.292 .176 .202 .33 .532 .116
(.012) (.009) (.01) (.011) (.006) (.02)
*** *** *** *** *** ***138 Parameter estimates
Table E.7
Model without selection on the unobservables (®1 = ®0 = 0), employment state 24
months after the end of the programme, marginal eﬀect of explanatory variables












Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.079 -.082
Cohabitating .013 .011
Has children .018 .016
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.069 -.068
Vocational education -.002 -.003
Further or higher education .079 .081
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years -.09 -.095
5-10 years .029 .024






State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.047 -.047
Ordinary education -.057 -.056
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.119 -.113
Ordinary education -.092 -.089
No available information -.072 -.07










Relative unemployment level .089 .095140 Parameter estimates
Table F.1
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters
determining selection into PRP programmes.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .781 .355 ** .197
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .11 .147 .028
30-39 -.06 .157 -.015
40-49 -.245 .192 -.062
50-66 -.138 .266 -.035
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .337 .202 * .085
Cohabitating .331 .125 *** .084
Has children .112 .16 .028
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.125 .112 -.031
Vocational education .17 .117 .043
Further or higher education -.517 .223 ** -.13
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .588 .126 *** .148
5-10 years .461 .159 *** .116
10+ years .443 .19 ** .112141
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .143 .149 .036
Ordinary education .159 .161 .04
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.632 .169 *** -.16
Ordinary education -.383 .209 * -.097
No available information -.259 .142 * -.065
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .803 .129 *** .203
1995 -.309 .099 *** -.078
1996 -.76 .117 *** -.192
1997 -.715 .133 *** -.181
1998 -.898 .157 *** -.227
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.051 .115 -.013
40,000-100,000 .073 .102 .018
>100,000 -.078 .103 -.02
Relative unemployment level -.827 .306 *** -.209
Relative importance of PRP programmes .31 .06 *** .078
Common unobserved factor 1.000142 Parameter estimates
Table F.2
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), participants
in PRP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme period.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .377 .416 .133
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .113 .138 .04
30-39 -.286 .154 * -.101
40-49 -.573 .199 *** -.203
50-66 -.549 .274 ** -.194
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.008 .198 -.003
Cohabitating -.03 .13 -.011
Has children .303 .159 * .107
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school -.195 .115 -.069
Vocational education .153 .109 .054
Further or higher education .532 .336 .188
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .218 .135 .077
5-10 years .496 .157 *** .175
10+ years .461 .189 ** .163143
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.332 .162 ** -.117
Ordinary education -.409 .182 ** -.145
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.744 .164 *** -.263
Ordinary education -.155 .216 -.055
No available information -.192 .142 -.068
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .006 .146 .002
1995 .101 .121 .036
1996 .183 .203 .065
1997 -.016 .195 -.006
1998 .11 .263 .039
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .271 .12 ** .096
40,000-100,000 .067 .103 .024
>100,000 .141 .115 .05
Relative unemployment level .073 .359 .026
Common unobserved factor -.311 .595144 Parameter estimates
Table F.3
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), participants
in PUP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme period.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .261 .739 .092
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 -.191 .164 -.067
30-39 -.715 .198 *** -.251
40-49 -1.064 .272 *** -.373
50-66 -1.332 .365 *** -.467
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .289 .257 .101
Cohabitating -.015 .159 -.005
Has children .281 .196 .098
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school -.022 .115 -.008
Vocational education .191 .155 .067
Further or higher education .243 .238 .085
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .593 .246 ** .208
5-10 years .516 .238 ** .181
10+ years .875 .283 *** .307145
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.182 .161 -.064
Ordinary education -.229 .164 -.08
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.534 .284 * -.187
Ordinary education .041 .231 .014
No available information -.033 .165 -.011
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 -.109 .274 -.038
1995 .119 .122 .042
1996 .201 .169 .07
1997 .168 .178 .059
1998 -.234 .257 -.082
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .284 .126 ** .1
40,000-100,000 .183 .13 .064
>100,000 .003 .111 .001
Relative unemployment level -.347 .384 -.122
Common unobserved factor .259 .717146 Parameter estimates
Table F.4
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employ-
ment state 24 months after the end of the programme, average treatment eﬀect













.307 .187 .245 .261 .506 .119
(.099) (.095) (.064) (.122) (.064) (.183)
*** ** *** ** ***
Table F.5
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme, average treatment eﬀect on the













.248 .231 .262 .26 .521 .017
(.127) (.159) (.127) (.159) (.043) (.284)
* ** ***147
Tables F.6
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), parame-
ters regarding the employment state 24 months after the end of the programme,
marginal treatment eﬀect 4MTE and associated distributional parameters regard-












.196 .285 .244 .276 .519 -.089
(.168) (.248) (.175) (.242) (.081) (.415)
***












.303 .182 .252 .263 .515 .122
(.103) (.085) (.082) (.106) (.036) (.185)
*** ** *** ** ***












.429 .105 .237 .229 .466 .324
(.223) (.091) (.117) (.211) (.133) (.314)
* ** ***
c. Values when UD = 2.148 Parameter estimates
Table F.7
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme, marginal eﬀect of explanatory












Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.104 -.089
Cohabitating -.005 .012
Has children .009 .013
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.061 -.068
Vocational education -.013 -.005
Further or higher education .103 .075
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years -.131 -.105
5-10 years -.006 .015






State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.054 -.045
Ordinary education -.064 -.055
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.076 -.106
Ordinary education -.069 -.09
No available information -.057 -.07










Relative unemployment level .148 .108
Relative importance of PRP programmes .016150 Parameter estimates
Table G.1
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employ-
ment state 6 months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters
determining selection into PRP programmes, instrument’s validation.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .94 .343 *** .237
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .064 .141 .016
30-39 -.077 .151 -.019
40-49 -.279 .187 -.07
50-66 -.135 .262 -.034
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .331 .201 * .084
Cohabitating .36 .124 *** .091
Has children .115 .161 .029
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.16 .109 -.041
Vocational education .162 .113 .041
Further or higher education -.448 .223 ** -.113
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .564 .121 *** .142
5-10 years .442 .154 *** .112
10+ years .46 .188 ** .116151
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .113 .145 .029
Ordinary education .132 .159 .033
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.59 .165 *** -.149
Ordinary education .-349 .205 * -.088
No available information -.211 .14 -.053
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .794 .128 *** .201
1995 -.291 .098 *** -.074
1996 -.773 .114 *** -.195
1997 -.757 .129 *** -.191
1998 -.887 .154 *** -.224
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.032 .113 -.008
40,000-100,000 .064 .1 .016
>100,000 -.053 .101 -.013
Relative unemployment level -.989 .291 *** -.25
Relative importance of PRP programmes .312 .059 *** .079
Common unobserved factor 1.000152 Parameter estimates
Table G.2
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PRP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 6 months after the end of the programme period, instrument’s validation.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .783 .57 .203
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .173 .233 .045
30-39 -.296 .311 -.077
40-49 -.81 .774 -.21
50-66 -.446 .499 -.116
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .107 .302 .028
Cohabitating .076 .237 .02
Has children .099 .216 .026
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .332 .24 .086
Vocational education .37 .368 .096
Further or higher education .073 .35 .019
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .495 .606 .129
5-10 years .619 .664 .161
10+ years .817 .841 .212153
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.558 .431 -.145
Ordinary education -.433 .347 -.112
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.894 .936 -.232
Ordinary education -.4 .504 -.104
No available information .034 .177 .009
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .286 .468 .074
1995 -.042 .198 -.011
1996 -.351 .629 -.091
1997 -.594 .812 -.154
1998 -.367 .725 -.095
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .271 .243 .067
40,000-100,000 .07 .151 .018
>100,000 .165 .176 .043
Relative unemployment level -.935 1.18 -.243
Relative importance of PRP programmes .096 .202 .025
Common unobserved factor .899 1.9154 Parameter estimates
Table G.3
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PUP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 6 months after the end of the programme period, instrument’s validation.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant -.225 .983 .-.017
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 -.629 .463 -.046
30-39 -1.753 .513 *** -.129
40-49 -2.45 .732 *** -.181
50-66 -2.328 .855 *** -.172
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.661 .631 -.049
Cohabitating -.285 .402 -.021
Has children 1.088 .524 ** .08
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school 1.033 .373 *** .076
Vocational education .257 .407 .019
Further or higher education 1.166 .598 * .086
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .974 .4 ** .072
5-10 years 1.054 .524 ** .078
10+ years 1.912 .707 *** .141155
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -1.82 .538 *** -.134
Ordinary education .449 .49 .033
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -1.361 .536 ** -.1
Ordinary education -.162 .641 -.012
No available information -.705 .448 -.052
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 -1.075 .439 ** -.079
1995 .366 .34 .027
1996 1.122 .396 *** .083
1997 1.512 .509 *** .112
1998 .752 .486 .056
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.228 .355 -.017
40,000-100,000 -.254 .337 -.019
>100,000 -.969 .344 *** -.072
Relative unemployment level -.686 .787 -.051
Relative importance of PRP programmes -.813 .234 *** -.06
Common unobserved factor -3.236 .54 ***156 Parameter estimates
Table H.1
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters
determining selection into PRP programmes, instrument’s validation.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .81 .355 ** .204
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .104 .146 .026
30-39 -.08 .157 -.02
40-49 -.257 .194 -.065
50-66 -.13 .264 -.033
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .338 .199 * .085
Cohabitating .324 .126 *** .082
Has children .11 .161 .028
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.127 .111 -.032
Vocational education .171 .116 .043
Further or higher education -.508 .223 ** -.128
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .6 .125 *** .151
5-10 years .458 .16 *** .116
10+ years .454 .19 ** .115157
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .132 .15 .033
Ordinary education .152 .161 .038
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.622 .17 *** -.157
Ordinary education -.364 .21 * -.092
No available information -.266 .142 * -.067
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .798 .13 *** .201
1995 -.312 .099 *** -.079
1996 -.764 .117 *** -.193
1997 -.722 .133 *** -.182
1998 -.909 .157 *** -.229
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.055 .115 -.014
40,000-100,000 .073 .103 .018
>100,000 -.081 .103 -.02
Relative unemployment level -.846 .304 *** -.213
Relative importance of PRP programmes .312 .06 *** .079
Common unobserved factor 1.000158 Parameter estimates
Table H.2
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PRP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme period, instrument’s validation.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 1.097 .576 * .32
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .063 .187 .018
30-39 -.31 .321 -.091
40-49 -.89 .853 -.26
50-66 -.832 .763 -.243
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .101 .312 .03
Cohabitating .099 .265 .029
Has children .16 .243 .047
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .007 .137 .002
Vocational education .327 .362 .095
Further or higher education .303 .317 .089
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .352 .573 .103
5-10 years .587 .695 .171
10+ years .742 .831 .216159
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.338 .263 -.099
Ordinary education -.269 .227 -.078
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.71 .87 -.207
Ordinary education -.205 .413 -.06
No available information .026 .186 .008
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .356 .615 .104
1995 -.007 .2 -.002
1996 -.159 .557 -.047
1997 -.328 .672 -.096
1998 -.229 .727 -.067
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .018 .125 .005
40,000-100,000 -.037 .117 -.011
>100,000 .172 .157 .05
Relative unemployment level -1.31 1.49 -.382
Relative importance of PRP programmes .138 .27 .04
Common unobserved factor .688 2.15160 Parameter estimates
Table H.3
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PUP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme period, instrument’s validation.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .782 2.30 .272
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .074 .191 .026
30-39 -.413 .325 -.143
40-49 -.759 .62 -.264
50-66 -.918 .626 -.319
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .154 .405 .053
Cohabitating .071 .319 .025
Has children .153 .245 .053
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .134 .114 .047
Vocational education .445 .382 .155
Further or higher education .293 .293 .102
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .25 .594 .087
5-10 years .228 .494 .079
10+ years .232 .512 .081161
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.413 .193 ** -.144
Ordinary education -.098 .172 -.034
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.495 .737 -.172
Ordinary education -.195 .43 -.068
No available information -.015 .259 -.005
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 -.043 .687 -.015
1995 -.15 .324 -.052
1996 -.088 .594 -.031
1997 -.044 .553 -.015
1998 -.38 .846 -.132
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .152 .125 .053
40,000-100,000 -.002 .127 -.001
>100,000 -.055 .151 -.019
Relative unemployment level -.436 .862 -.151
Relative importance of PRP programmes -.098 .195 -.034
Common unobserved factor .308 2.49162 Parameter estimates
Table I.1
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters
determining selection into PRP programmes, instrument’s validation.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .809 .347 ** .204
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .086 .146 .022
30-39 -.141 .156 -.036
40-49 -.311 .190 -.079
50-66 -.191 .261 -.048
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .365 .198 * .092
Cohabitating .337 .124 *** .085
Has children .09 .159 .023
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.162 .11 -.041
Vocational education .164 .116 .041
Further or higher education -.466 .22 ** -.117
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .604 .125 *** .152
5-10 years .502 .159 *** .127
10+ years .506 .189 *** .128163
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .138 .147 .035
Ordinary education .172 .16 .043
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.6 .168 *** -.151
Ordinary education -.324 .208 -.082
No available information -.249 .141 * -.063
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .801 .129 *** .202
1995 -.311 .099 *** -.078
1996 -.767 .116 *** -.193
1997 -.714 .131 *** -.180
1998 -.902 .154 *** -.228
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.038 .114 -.01
40,000-100,000 .07 .102 .018
>100,000 -.089 .102 -.022
Relative unemployment level -.845 .297 *** -.213
Relative importance of PRP programmes .304 .06 *** .077
Common unobserved factor 1.000164 Parameter estimates
Table I.2
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PRP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme period, instrument’s validation.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant -.044 .643 -.008
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .245 .24 .044
30-39 -.524 .275 * -.093
40-49 -1.095 .437 ** -.195
50-66 -1.01 .535 * -.179
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .209 .33 .037
Cohabitating .168 .211 .03
Has children .496 .286 * .088
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school -.426 .238 * -.076
Vocational education .329 .197 * .058
Further or higher education .529 .514 .094
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .682 .287 ** .121
5-10 years 1.077 .381 *** .191
10+ years 1.034 .42 ** .184165
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.441 .276 -.078
Ordinary education -.555 .32 * -.099
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -1.56 .512 *** -.277
Ordinary education -.449 .38 -.08
No available information -.457 .264 * -.081
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .418 .229 ** .074
1995 -.03 .181 -.005
1996 -.233 .269 -.041
1997 -.496 .338 -.088
1998 -.426 .362 -.076
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .44 .233 * .078
40,000-100,000 .162 .181 .029
>100,000 .212 .192 .038
Relative unemployment level -.488 .614 -.087
Relative importance of PRP programmes .266 .135 ** .047
Common unobserved factor 1.56 .614 **166 Parameter estimates
Table I.3
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PUP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme period, instrument’s validation.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant -1.23 .977 -.177
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 -.392 .355 -.057
30-39 -1.156 .580 ** -.167
40-49 -1.618 .722 ** -.234
50-66 -2.2 1.01 ** -.318
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .339 .425 .049
Cohabitating -.227 .285 -.033
Has children .399 .357 .058
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .08 .211 .012
Vocational education .232 .259 .033
Further or higher education .659 .522 .095
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .652 .34 * .094
5-10 years .561 .355 .081
10+ years 1.187 .568 ** .171167
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.418 .353 -.06
Ordinary education -.526 .385 -.076
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.502 .367 -.072
Ordinary education .33 .447 .048
No available information .157 .309 .023
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 -.785 .431 * -.113
1995 .451 .343 .065
1996 .891 .543 .129
1997 .792 .525 .114
1998 .215 .378 .031
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .528 .308 * .076
40,000-100,000 .286 .24 .041
>100,000 .071 .207 .01
Relative unemployment level -.117 .575 -.017
Relative importance of PRP programmes -.2 .17 -.029
Common unobserved factor -1.64 .842 *168 Parameter estimates
Table J.1
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employ-
ment state 6 months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters
determining selection into PRP programmes, no additional instrument.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 1.243 .344 *** .316
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .103 .145 .026
30-39 -.092 .153 -.023
40-49 -.257 .188 -.065
50-66 -.151 .258 -.038
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .354 .199 * .09
Cohabitating .335 .124 *** .085
Has children .11 .161 .028
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.141 .111 -.036
Vocational education .167 .115 .042
Further or higher education -.451 .22 ** -.115
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .602 .124 *** .153
5-10 years .484 .157 *** .123
10+ years .485 .186 *** .123169
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .139 .147 .035
Ordinary education .201 .16 .051
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.633 .169 *** -.161
Ordinary education .-34 .209 -.086
No available information -.238 .142 * -.06
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .838 .13 *** .213
1995 -.29 .098 *** -.074
1996 -.74 .116 *** -.188
1997 -.704 .132 *** -.179
1998 -.886 .157 *** -.225
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.043 .113 -.011
40,000-100,000 .134 .1 .034
>100,000 -.123 .102 -.031
Relative unemployment level -.966 .299 *** -.245
Common unobserved factor 1.000170 Parameter estimates
Table J.2
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PRP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 6 months after the end of the programme period, no additional instrument.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .89 .682 .246
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .167 .255 .046
30-39 -.295 .348 -.082
40-49 -.772 .84 -.214
50-66 -.446 .551 -.123
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .103 .337 .029
Cohabitating -.058 .255 .016
Has children .088 .211 .024
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .329 .261 .091
Vocational education .355 .414 .098
Further or higher education .099 .348 .027
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .476 .717 .131
5-10 years .6 .777 .166
10+ years .787 .962 .218171
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.528 .435 -.146
Ordinary education -.403 .318 -.111
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.845 1.07 -.234
Ordinary education -.366 .547 -.101
No available information .035 .181 .01
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .269 .58 .075
1995 -.023 .209 -.006
1996 -.307 .696 -.085
1997 -.524 .866 -.145
1998 -.313 .823 -.087
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .236 .237 .065
40,000-100,000 .077 .181 .021
>100,000 .135 .14 .037
Relative unemployment level -.907 1.32 -.251
Common unobserved factor .785 2.29172 Parameter estimates
Table J.3
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PUP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 6 months after the end of the programme period, no additional instrument.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant -.189 .671 .-.027
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 -.424 .329 -.06
30-39 -.878 .437 ** -.125
40-49 -1.455 .614 ** -.207
50-66 -1.315 .714 * -.187
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.41 .447 -.058
Cohabitating -.054 .266 -.008
Has children .689 .414 * .098
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .491 .288 * .07
Vocational education .131 .246 .019
Further or higher education .765 .511 .109
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .309 .246 .044
5-10 years .387 .323 .055
10+ years 1.148 .519 ** .163173
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -1.062 .535 ** -.151
Ordinary education -.036 .277 -.005
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.61 .365 * -.087
Ordinary education -.068 .384 -.01
No available information -.154 .267 -.022
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 -.739 .474 -.105
1995 .195 .238 .027
1996 .414 .338 .059
1997 .464 .37 .066
1998 .341 .362 .048
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.049 .212 -.007
40,000-100,000 -.208 .213 -.029
>100,000 -.355 .234 -.05
Relative unemployment level -.648 .509 -.092
Common unobserved factor -1.564 .824 *174 Parameter estimates
Table K.1
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters
determining selection into PRP programmes, no additional instrument.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 1.138 .346 *** .29
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .116 .146 .03
30-39 -.07 .156 -.018
40-49 -.238 .19 -.06
50-66 -.15 .258 -.038
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .353 .198 * .09
Cohabitating .324 .125 *** .083
Has children .123 .16 .031
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.118 .111 -.03
Vocational education .167 .115 .042
Further or higher education -.454 .221 ** -.116
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .599 .125 *** .153
5-10 years .485 .158 *** .123
10+ years .477 .186 ** .121175
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .132 .148 .033
Ordinary education .206 .159 .052
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.633 .169 *** -.161
Ordinary education -.366 .208 * -.093
No available information -.244 .141 * -.062
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .834 .13 *** .212
1995 -.296 .098 *** -.075
1996 -.728 .116 *** -.185
1997 -.7 .132 *** -.178
1998 -.877 .158 *** -.223
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.037 .114 -.009
40,000-100,000 .145 .101 .037
>100,000 -.12 .102 -.031
Relative unemployment level -.872 .303 *** -.222
Common unobserved factor 1.000176 Parameter estimates
Table K.2
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PRP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme period, no additional instrument.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 1.356 .721 * .493
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .027 .143 .01
30-39 -.267 .152 * -.097
40-49 -.726 .193 *** -.264
50-66 -.715 .27 *** -.26
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .022 .223 .008
Cohabitating .019 .171 .004
Has children .122 .15 .044
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .037 .122 .013
Vocational education .253 .108 ** .092
Further or higher education .42 .403 .153
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .168 .236 .061
5-10 years .406 .187 ** .148
10+ years .549 .204 *** .2177
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.331 .187 * -.12
Ordinary education -.273 .211 -.1
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.479 .215 ** -.174
Ordinary education -.093 .241 -.034
No available information .076 .168 .027
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .156 .265 .057
1995 .073 .172 .026
1996 .055 .363 .02
1997 -.105 .331 -.038
1998 .033 .462 .012
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .009 .109 .003
40,000-100,000 -.054 .125 -.02
>100,000 .143 .127 .052
Relative unemployment level -1.01 .365 *** -.368
Common unobserved factor -.191 1.45178 Parameter estimates
Table K.3
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PUP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme period, no additional instrument.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .706 3.04 .242
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .075 .218 .026
30-39 -.419 .408 -.143
40-49 -.781 .804 -.267
50-66 -.925 .835 -.316
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .169 .489 .058
Cohabitating .081 .374 .028
Has children .149 .294 .051
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .135 .114 .046
Vocational education .458 .498 .157
Further or higher education .264 .283 .09
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .269 .733 .092
5-10 years .242 .625 .083
10+ years .245 .639 .084179
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.426 .241 * -.146
Ordinary education -.113 .188 -.039
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.496 .929 -.17
Ordinary education -.201 .514 -.069
No available information -.019 .28 -.006
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .047 .83 -.016
1995 -.157 .387 -.054
1996 -.118 .7 -.04
1997 -.068 .654 -.023
1998 -.42 1.05 -.144
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .14 .138 .048
40,000-100,000 -.04 .149 -.014
>100,000 -.074 .201 -.025
Relative unemployment level -.398 1.07 -.136
Common unobserved factor .375 3180 Parameter estimates
Table L.1
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters
determining selection into PRP programmes, no additional instrument.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 1.15 .346 *** .292
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .121 .147 .031
30-39 -.07 .156 -.018
40-49 -.233 .189 -.059
50-66 -.143 .259 -.036
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .346 .199 * .088
Cohabitating .326 .125 *** .083
Has children .122 .159 .031
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.118 .111 -.03
Vocational education .17 .116 .043
Further or higher education -.461 .221 ** -.117
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .597 .125 *** .152
5-10 years .478 .159 *** .122
10+ years .476 .188 ** .121181
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .131 .148 .033
Ordinary education .205 .16 .052
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.635 .169 *** -.162
Ordinary education -.361 .208 * -.092
No available information -.245 .141 * -.062
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .831 .13 *** .211
1995 -.3 .099 *** -.076
1996 -.731 .116 *** -.186
1997 -.699 .132 *** -.178
1998 -.88 .158 *** -.224
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.044 .113 -.011
40,000-100,000 .146 .101 .037
>100,000 -.124 .102 -.032
Relative unemployment level -.877 .303 *** -.223
Common unobserved factor 1.000182 Parameter estimates
Table L.2
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PRP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme period, no additional instrument.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .306 .522 .113
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .121 .144 .045
30-39 -.281 .145 * -.104
40-49 -.572 .205 *** -.212
50-66 -.539 .26 ** -.2
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .018 .226 .007
Cohabitating -.003 .172 -.001
Has children .3 .156 * .111
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school -.197 .12 * -.073
Vocational education .164 .124 .061
Further or higher education .471 .364 .174
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .259 .272 .096
5-10 years .513 .24 ** .19
10+ years .481 .267 * .178183
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.311 .154 ** -.115
Ordinary education -.383 .18 ** -.142
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.769 .297 *** -.284
Ordinary education -.179 .25 -.066
No available information -.206 .162 -.076
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .067 .302 .025
1995 .073 .165 .027
1996 .109 .362 .04
1997 -.08 .352 -.03
1998 .023 .468 .008
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .257 .11 ** .095
40,000-100,000 .073 .118 .027
>100,000 .119 .112 .044
Relative unemployment level -.015 .467 -.005
Common unobserved factor .006 1.45184 Parameter estimates
Table L.3
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PUP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme period, no additional instrument.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .287 2.79 .099
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 -.191 .167 -.066
30-39 -.728 .559 -.252
40-49 -1.08 .924 -.373
50-66 -1.35 1.02 -.466
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .295 .551 .102
Cohabitating -.005 .325 -.002
Has children .286 .355 .099
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school -.022 .16 -.008
Vocational education .202 .328 .07
Further or higher education .242 .318 .084
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .612 .936 .212
5-10 years .535 .776 .185
10+ years .9 1.01 .311185
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.186 .163 -.064
Ordinary education -.228 .168 -.079
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.55 .933 -.19
Ordinary education .04 .367 .014
No available information -.035 .293 -.012
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 -.09 .836 -.032
1995 .118 .228 .041
1996 .188 .518 .065
1997 .15 .527 .052
1998 -.252 .928 -.087
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .293 .189 .101
40,000-100,000 .192 .272 .067
>100,000 -.004 .164 -.001
Relative unemployment level -.337 1.02 -.117
Common unobserved factor .327 3.02186 Parameter estimates
Table M.1
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employ-
ment state 6 months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters
determining selection into PRP programmes, discrete distr. of the common factor.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 1.04 .359 *** .26
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .128 .144 .032
30-39 -.032 .157 -.008
40-49 -.224 .198 -.056
50-66 -.16 .261 -.04
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .36 .198 * .09
Cohabitating .342 .126 *** .085
Has children .09 .157 .022
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.132 .118 -.033
Vocational education .156 .112 .039
Further or higher education -.597 .242 ** -.149
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .627 .128 *** .157
5-10 years .474 .161 *** .118
10+ years .443 .195 ** .111187
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .142 .149 .036
Ordinary education .194 .171 .048
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.608 .172 *** -.152
Ordinary education -.355 .217 -.089
No available information -.242 .146 * -.061
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .715 .128 *** .179
1995 -.328 .105 *** -.082
1996 -.873 .138 *** -.218
1997 -.772 .156 *** -.193
1998 -1.045 .181 *** -.261
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.011 .116 -.003
40,000-100,000 .055 .102 .014
>100,000 -.066 .108 -.017
Relative unemployment level -.981 .314 *** -.245
Relative importance of PRP programmes .307 .061 *** .077
Common unobserved factor 1.000188 Parameter estimates
Table M.2
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PRP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 6 months after the end of the programme period, discrete distribution of the
common factor.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .799 .369 ** .287
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .138 .139 .05
30-39 -.232 .152 -.083
40-49 -.612 .193 *** -.22
50-66 -.351 .257 -.126
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .041 .191 .015
Cohabitating .008 .127 .003
Has children .067 .151 .024
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .297 .112 *** .107
Vocational education .278 .113 ** .1
Further or higher education .135 .27 .049
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .327 .16 ** .117
5-10 years .441 .178 ** .159
10+ years .596 .203 *** .214189
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.463 .144 *** -.166
Ordinary education -.363 .16 ** -.13
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.636 .195 *** -.229
Ordinary education -.265 .216 -.095
No available information .057 .139 .021
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .131 .135 .047
1995 .015 .113 .005
1996 -.166 .199 -.06
1997 -.354 .205 * -.127
1998 -.161 .279 -.058
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .208 .111 * .074
40,000-100,000 .051 .101 .018
>100,000 .124 .105 .044
Relative unemployment level -.578 .376 -.208
Common unobserved factor .162 .351190 Parameter estimates
Table M.3
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PUP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 6 months after the end of the programme period, discrete distribution of the
common factor.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 2.98 6.99 .423
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 -.383 .216 * -.054
30-39 -.733 .296 ** -.104
40-49 -1.434 .536 *** -.204
50-66 -1.185 .547 ** -.168
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.065 .301 -.009
Cohabitating .185 .178 .026
Has children .526 .254 ** .074
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .273 .138 ** .039
Vocational education .161 .171 .023
Further or higher education .362 .308 .051
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .604 .243 ** .086
5-10 years .619 .316 * .088
10+ years 1.216 .456 *** .173191
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.611 .237 *** -.087
Ordinary education .071 .179 .01
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.776 .349 ** -.11
Ordinary education -.218 .256 -.031
No available information -.181 .18 -.026
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 -.104 .195 -.015
1995 .022 .13 .003
1996 -.169 .177 -.024
1997 -.017 .172 -.002
1998 -.254 .215 -.036
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.021 .139 -.003
40,000-100,000 -.086 .129 -.012
>100,000 -.235 .142 * -.033
Relative unemployment level -1.35 .542 ** -.192
Common unobserved factor 2.3 10.29192 Parameter estimates
Table M.4
Model where the common factor follows a discrete distribution and there is selec-
tion on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment state 6 months
after the end of the programme, the average treatment eﬀect 4ATE and associated












.19 .24 .301 269 .57 -.05
(.079) (.026) (128.735) (128.734) (.074) (.092)
** *** ***
Table M.5
Model where the common factor follows a discrete distribution and there is selec-
tion on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment state 6 months
after the end of the programme, the average treatment eﬀect on the treated 4TT












.123 .291 .402 .184 .586 -.168
(.042) (.041) (.043) (.04) (.076) (.033)
*** *** *** *** *** ***193
Tables M.6
Model where the common factor follows a discrete distribution, there is selec-
tion on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), parameters regarding the
employment state 6 months after the end of the programme, marginal treatment
eﬀect 4MTE and associated distributional treatment when, respectively, UD = ¡2,












.02 .457 .622 -.099 .522 -.437
(.009) (.113) (.112) (.016) (.12) (.106)
** *** *** *** *** ***












.213 .184 .222 .381 .603 .028
(.089) (.037) (.032) (.086) (.061) (.121)
** *** *** *** ***












.307 .171 .191 .331 .522 .136
(.13) (.076) (.067) (.127) (.066) (.203)
** ** *** *** ***
c. Values when UD = 2.194 Parameter estimates
Table M.7
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), discrete
distribution of the common factor, employment state 6 months after the end of
the programme, marginal eﬀect of explanatory variables on the average treatment












Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .028 .053
Cohabitating -.036 .005
Has children -.085 -.042
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school .05 .054
Vocational education .067 .087
Further or higher education -.027 -.053
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years -.008 .081
5-10 years .03 .105






State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.04 -.063
Ordinary education -.145 -.119
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.067 -.162
Ordinary education -.05 -.09
No available information .058 .025










Relative unemployment level .072 -.093
Relative importance of PRP programmes .025196 Parameter estimates
Table N.1
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters
determining selection into PRP programmes, discrete distr. of the common factor.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .88 .372 ** .219
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .159 .151 .039
30-39 -.074 .162 -.018
40-49 -.241 .201 -.06
50-66 -.272 .288 -.068
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .389 .197 ** .097
Cohabitating .369 .129 *** .092
Has children .046 .159 .011
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school -.144 .12 -.036
Vocational education .15 .117 .037
Further or higher education -.683 .23 *** -.17
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .632 .128 *** .157
5-10 years .525 .162 *** .131
10+ years .562 .197 *** .14197
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .191 .154 .048
Ordinary education .199 .173 .05
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.683 .174 *** -.159
Ordinary education -.343 .223 -.085
No available information -.222 .151 -.055
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .768 .133 *** .191
1995 -.349 .108 *** -.087
1996 -.891 .131 *** -.222
1997 -.782 .15 *** -.195
1998 -1.03 .172 *** -.255
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.053 .121 -.013
40,000-100,000 .042 .106 .011
>100,000 -.093 .11 -.023
Relative unemployment level -.884 .322 *** -.22
Relative importance of PRP programmes .322 .062 *** .08
Common unobserved factor 1.000 .198 Parameter estimates
Table N.2
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PRP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme period, discrete distribution of
the common factor.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 1.42 .482 *** .486
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .011 .146 .004
30-39 -.275 .16 * -.095
40-49 -.747 .213 *** -.257
50-66 -.727 .278 *** -.25
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.01 .203 -.003
Cohabitating -.019 .135 -.006
Has children .127 .157 .044
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .049 .12 .017
Vocational education .253 .112 ** .087
Further or higher education .496 .329 .171
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .124 .15 .043
5-10 years .384 .167 ** .132
10+ years .52 .193 *** .179199
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.364 .173 ** -.125
Ordinary education -.304 .183 * -.105
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.456 .167 *** -.157
Ordinary education -.084 .219 -.029
No available information .089 .147 .03
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .108 .141 .037
1995 .111 .128 .038
1996 .147 .212 .05
1997 -.03 .198 -.01
1998 .138 .278 .047
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .022 .115 .007
40,000-100,000 -.056 .107 -.019
>100,000 .173 .122 .06
Relative unemployment level -.958 .348 *** -.329
Common unobserved factor -.359 .441200 Parameter estimates
Table N.3
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PUP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 12 months after the end of the programme period, discrete distribution of
the common factor.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 5.44 313 .279
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .118 .196 .006
30-39 -.719 .292 ** -.037
40-49 -1.37 .492 *** -.07
50-66 -4.34 295 -.222
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .478 .337 .025
Cohabitating .217 .175 .011
Has children -.013 .253 -.001
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school .146 .138 .007
Vocational education .588 .191 *** .03
Further or higher education -.133 .433 -.007
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .371 .19 * .019
5-10 years .431 .277 .022
10+ years .812 .399 ** .042201
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.35 .205 * -.018
Ordinary education -.078 .191 -.004
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.763 .289 *** -.039
Ordinary education -.199 .272 -.01
No available information .014 .19 .001
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 -.068 .185 -.003
1995 -.201 .137 -.01
1996 -.307 .175 * -.016
1997 -.139 .184 -.007
1998 -.711 .26 *** -.036
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .124 .147 .006
40,000-100,000 -.095 .14 -.005
>100,000 -.144 .14 -.007
Relative unemployment level -.634 .413 -.032
Common unobserved factor 6.038 394202 Parameter estimates
Table N.4
Model where the common factor follows a discrete distribution and there is selec-
tion on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment state 12 months
after the end of the programme, the average treatment eﬀect 4ATE and associated












.273 .272 .318 .137 .455 .001
(.115) (.031) (1854.612) (1854.597) (.097) (.138)
** *** ***
Table N.5
Model where the common factor follows a discrete distribution and there is selec-
tion on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment state 12 months
after the end of the programme, the average treatment eﬀect on the treated 4TT












.142 .39 .377 .091 .468 -.249
(.065) (.047) (.067) (.048) (.083) (.077)
** *** *** * *** ***203
Tables N.6
Model where the common factor follows a discrete distribution, there is selec-
tion on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), parameters regarding the
employment state 12 months after the end of the programme, marginal treatment
eﬀect 4MTE and associated distributional treatment when, respectively, UD = ¡2,












.021 .65 .495 .-166 .329 -.629
(.009) (.106) (.106) (.008) (.112) (.1)
** *** *** *** *** ***












.282 .194 .264 .26 .524 .088
(.119) (.034) (.092) (.101) (.088) (.151)
** *** *** *** ***












.508 .099 .284 .109 .393 .41
(.214) (.087) (.181) (.182) (.128) (.301)
** ***
c. Values when UD = 2.204 Parameter estimates
Table N.7
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), discrete
distribution of the common factor, employment state 12 months after the end of
the programme, marginal eﬀect of explanatory variables on the average treatment












Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.093 .0003
Cohabitating -.047 .024
Has children .046 .052
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.01 -.021
Vocational education -.023 .042
Further or higher education .195 .084
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years -.027 .094
5-10 years .051 .16






State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.059 -.057
Ordinary education -.089 -.066
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.014 -.164
Ordinary education .009 -.057
No available information .028 -.004










Relative unemployment level -.209 -.386
Relative importance of PRP programmes .047206 Parameter estimates
Table O.1
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme, estimates of the parameters
determining selection into PRP programmes, discrete distr. of the common factor.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .926 .373 ** .23
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .129 .152 .032
30-39 -.086 .164 -.021
40-49 -.272 .201 -.068
50-66 -.283 .265 -.07
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .433 .208 ** .108
Cohabitating .377 .129 *** .094
Has children .07 .158 .017
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school -.184 .118 -.046
Vocational education .17 .118 .042
Further or higher education -.62 .233 *** -.154
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .643 .128 *** .16
5-10 years .524 .163 *** .13
10+ years .566 .201 *** .141207
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment .145 .155 .036
Ordinary education .196 .174 .049
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.579 .174 *** -.144
Ordinary education -.278 .221 -.069
No available information -.198 .149 -.049
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .756 .134 *** .188
1995 -.371 .109 *** -.092
1996 -.876 .131 *** -.218
1997 -.864 .147 *** -.215
1998 -1.02 .173 *** -.253
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 -.061 .12 -.015
40,000-100,000 .051 .106 .013
>100,000 -.096 .111 -.024
Relative unemployment level -.911 .326 *** -.226
Relative importance of PRP programmes .31 .62 *** .077
Common unobserved factor 1.000 .208 Parameter estimates
Table O.2
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PRP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme period, discrete distribution of
the common factor.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant .333 .383 .121
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 .113 .137 .041
30-39 -.276 .147 * -.101
40-49 -.558 .191 *** -.203
50-66 -.528 .262 ** -.192
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.012 .198 -.004
Cohabitating -.03 .129 -.011
Has children .301 .154 * .11
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school -.19 .113 * -.069
Vocational education .153 .108 .055
Further or higher education .516 .314 .188
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .212 .142 .077
5-10 years .483 .157 *** .176
10+ years .443 .192 ** .161209
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.327 .154 ** -.119
Ordinary education -.403 .172 ** -.147
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.741 .162 *** -.269
Ordinary education -.164 .211 -.06
No available information -.198 .14 -.072
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 .016 .143 .006
1995 .103 .124 .038
1996 .183 .203 .067
1997 -.013 .207 -.005
1998 .103 .254 .038
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .267 .115 ** .097
40,000-100,000 .071 .101 .026
>100,000 .14 .112 .051
Relative unemployment level .074 .352 .027
Common unobserved factor -.202 .408210 Parameter estimates
Table O.3
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), participants
in PUP programmes, estimates of the parameters determining the employment
state 24 months after the end of the programme period, discrete distribution of
the common factor.
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
Constant 5.14 49.3 .26
Age (r.g.: 17-24)
25-29 -.393 .232 * -.02
30-39 -1.328 .351 *** -.067
40-49 -2.046 .516 *** -.103
50-66 -3.225 1.06 *** -.163
Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married .735 .323 ** .037
Cohabitating .171 .181 .009
Has children .248 .245 .013
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec.
school)
Upper secondary school -.167 .155 -.008
Vocational education .226 .183 .011
Further or higher education .096 .364 .005
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years .972 .219 *** .049
5-10 years 1.097 .316 *** .055
10+ years 1.951 .464 *** .099211
Coeﬀ. Std. Sgl. Marg.
State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.175 .203 -.009
Ordinary education -.189 .209 -.01
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.654 .268 ** -.033
Ordinary education .306 .289 .015
No available information .12 .2 .006
Year when programme started (r.g.: 1994)
1993 -.099 .203 -.005
1995 .047 .141 .002
1996 .066 .175 .003
1997 -.062 .193 -.003
1998 -.587 .281 ** -.03
Residents in municipality (r.g.: <20,000)
20,000-40,000 .306 .159 * .015
40,000-100,000 .186 .143 .009
>100,000 -.068 .151 -.003
Relative unemployment level -.698 .446 -.035
Common unobserved factor 6.09 61.55212 Parameter estimates
Table O.4
Model where the common factor follows a discrete distribution and there is selec-
tion on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment state 24 months
after the end of the programme, the average treatment eﬀect 4ATE and associated












.235 .284 .304 .178 .481 -.05
(0.111) (.044) (941.904) (941.896) (.091) (.142)
** *** ***
Table O.5
Model where the common factor follows a discrete distribution and there is selec-
tion on the unobservables (®1 6= 0;®0 6= 0;®1 6= ®0), employment state 24 months
after the end of the programme, the average treatment eﬀect on the treated 4TT












.12 .393 .377 .11 .487 -.273
(.059) (.051) (.061) (.051) (.079) (.078)
** *** *** ** *** ***213
Tables O.6
Model where the common factor follows a discrete distribution, there is selec-
tion on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), parameters regarding the
employment state 24 months after the end of the programme, marginal treatment
eﬀect 4MTE and associated distributional treatment when, respectively, UD = ¡2,












.018 .633 .512 -.163 .349 -.616
(.008) (.104) (.104) (.008) (.11) (.098)
** *** *** *** *** ***












.24 .211 .247 .301 .549 .029
(.114) (.046) (.078) (.107) (.08) (.154)
** *** *** *** ***












.441 .128 .242 .189 .431 .314
(.209) (.103) (.158) (.196) (.111) (.31)
** ***
c. Values when UD = 2.214 Parameter estimates
Table 0.7
Model with selection on the unobservables (®1 6= 0; ®0 6= 0; ®1 6= ®0), discrete
distribution of the common factor, employment state 24 months after the end of
the programme, marginal eﬀect of explanatory variables on the average treatment












Marital state (r.g.: Single)
Married -.133 -.024
Cohabitating -.041 .02
Has children .066 .089
Completed education (r.g.: Primary or lower sec-
ondary school)
Upper secondary school -.04 -.073
Vocational education .016 .052
Further or higher education .17 .092
Work experience (r.g.: 0-2 years)
2-5 years -.094 .057
5-10 years -.017 .124






State during the 12 months preceding the pro-
gramme period (r.g.: Employment)
Unemployment -.088 -.078
Ordinary education -.113 -.097
State during 24 months period starting 3 years and
ending 1 year before the programme period (r.g.:
Employment)
Unemployment -.154 -.268
Ordinary education -.113 -.126
No available information -.093 -.108










Relative unemployment level .149 -.02
Relative importance of PRP programmes .04Bibliography
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